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OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

CHARACTER AND PRESENT STATE

OF THE

MILITARY FORCE

OF

G R E A T B R I T A I N .

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OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

CHARACTER, &c.

AS all hope of opposing an effectual barrier to the power and ambition of France on the continent, appears to be terminated by the unparalleled misfortunes which have attended the allied arms, it is evident that Britain must depend solely on her own exertions for the protection of her rights, and for the vindication of her rank and consequence in the scale of independent nations. In these circumstances, it is natural to enquire with no common anxiety, whether a system of national defence is established, adequate to the exigencies of the times, efficient either for the purposes of internal security, or if a proper occasion should offer, capable of being employed in enterprises of active hostility.

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Those to whom the management of these important arrangements is committed, appear to imagine, that the simple statement of 800,000 men in arms, ought to set all doubts on this subject for ever at rest. It is hardly necessary, however, to observe, that as this immense mass is composed of troops trained to various degrees of regularity, it is impossible to form a correct estimate of its efficacy, or of the merit of those by whom it has been collected, unless we endeavour to ascertain the value of the different sorts of force of which it is composed, and unless we are acquainted with the methods resorted to for bringing it into its present form. The object of the following observations, is therefore to examine the separate merits of each description of our military force with the view of ascertaining whether we are really possessed of an effective army, or whether we are merely deceived by a formidable array of figures.

For this purpose, and as all our reasonings upon this subject must be extremely erroneous and obscure, unless they are founded on a just conception of those principles on which the perfection of the military character depends, it will be necessary before proceeding to a detailed consideration of our system of defence, to exhibit a general view of military discipline. Having thus obtained a standard, by which the degrees of excellence to be attained by troops placed in different circumstances, may to a certain extent

extent be determined, we shall then proceed with greater certainty and advantage in the particular analysis of that force which in point of number is unquestionably more than equal to the exigencies of the present times. As the Volunteer system is regarded by its more zealous advocates, as a source both of present security, and of lasting strength, as it is looked upon indeed as the very foundation of all future exertion, it will be proper to enquire, *First*, how far it is possible to incorporate into that institution, the principles of military discipline, and whether it has tended by infusing a warlike spirit among the people, to facilitate the recruiting of the Regular Army, *2dly*, to examine that description of our force, whose services are limited, and, *3dly*, to consider the Regular Army, and the methods which have been adopted for its increase.

General View of Military Discipline.

THE attainment of excellence in any of those various professions or occupations by which the aspect of society is diversified, depends either on mechanical dexterity, or on the cultivation and perfection of certain qualities, either moral, or intellectual.

As there are few employments in which the mind does not participate, so there are few professions which are purely intellectual. The bearings and relations of different occupations to the mind are however very different, some depending principally on mechanical dexterity, others chiefly on the formation of peculiar mental habits, or qualities. As the influence of those qualities is less palpable to the sense, their importance is apt to be overlooked by superficial observers. If, however, we examine the subject with the slightest attention, it will clearly appear that there is not any one employment in which the natural propensities are not forced into an artificial direction, and that in order to effect this purpose, there must exist a power of sufficient efficacy to controul the mind, and in many professions a system of tedious discipline to conform it to those habits which they peculiarly require. It would be impossible for instance to practise either the profession of a surgeon or physician, unless several of the strongest feelings of our nature were previously subdued. The heart must be divested of its natural sensibility to human misery by a course of preliminary instruction, and to those who have been accustomed to a different way of life, and who have consequently acquired different habits, it appears astonishing, that men who are perpetually familiar with all the varieties of human distress,

trefs, should mingle with seeming unconcern in the most cheerful scenes, without any alloy from the remembrance of those spectacles of anguish and affliction, of which they are the constant witnesses. But on a more attentive consideration this apparent insensibility will appear to be the necessary result of that process of discipline which the mind has undergone, and without which it would be impossible in this profession to derive practical benefit from theoretic skill.

The rewards which attend success on the one hand, and the evils which attach to miscarriage on the other, acting constantly on the hopes and fears of the mind, are the general incentives to diligence and zeal in every occupation. When a man has once fixed upon any particular employment, he very soon learns that his general character, and consequently his importance in society depends entirely on the degree of professional eminence to which he attains. By mingling most frequently with those who are engaged in similar pursuits he insensibly imbibes their peculiar habits of thinking, he connects artificial ideas of disgrace or honour with their censures or praises, and he gradually acquires that *esprit du corps* which is absolutely necessary to ensure success in every department of industry. The rewards which are attached to professional eminence vary according to the nature and spirit of different professions, ac-

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ording also as the natural inclinations are more or less controuled. The merchant plods on from day to day with unremitting assiduity in the hope of spending his old age in ease and affluence; the statesman aspires to power and lasting fame; the soldier is compensated for all his toils by rank and honour.

In all those employments where success or eminence depends on contempt of danger or death, and where consequently the importance of mental qualities decidedly predominates, the feelings of nature are so rooted and powerful that the grand object ought to be to find out a principle of sufficient force to counteract their effects, and altho' at first view this may appear impracticable, on account of the potent influence with which they act upon the mind, yet this very circumstance furnishes a sure ground from which they may be successfully assailed. All perilous professions afford the means of their own support; they are peculiarly favourable to the growth of enthusiasm, and are chiefly upheld by the fear of shame, and the love of glory; two principles which spring from the same root, and operate in the same direction, with this difference, that the first is only calculated to prevent an open breach of duty, while the other is of more unlimited efficacy, and animates to exertions of active heroism. These two passions are the materials which must be employed; they are the seminal principles originally implanted in the mind, and they must be

be matured into moral habitudes, by a course of patient cultivation. As the heart, if it were left to the unassisted influence of its own feelings, would undoubtedly shrink in the hour of trial, those qualities by which it is enabled bravely to confront peril, must be called forth, and propped by a variety of collateral supports. The employment of a sailor leads him into a perpetual intercourse with dangers of the most terrific kind, and the preliminary tuition which he receives, before he acquires a knowledge of his art, disciplines him into intrepidity and presence of mind. Among sailors a reluctance to execute any hazardous duty, affixes infamy to a man's character ; those who exhibit indications of a timid spirit, are treated with every species of obloquy ; they are despised by those who have the most frequent opportunity of manifesting their contempt, and whose estimation they are most anxious to gain. It is impossible to conceive a more efficacious discipline for the mind, and it is not surprising, that it produces at length a degree of heroism, of which men in the quiet occupations of civil society have no adequate conception.

The attainment of eminence in the military profession, is closely connected with the perfection of those moral qualities, by which the mind, in scenes of peril, is supported and preserved in full possession of its faculties. Accordingly, a complicated system of discipline has been contrived in order to qualify men
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for the duties of active warfare. In order to explain more clearly, the foundation of military obedience, it will be necessary fully and distinctly to trace the connexion between general principles and particular regulations, that we may be enabled to separate what is essentially necessary to the existence of the system, from what is merely accidental, and liable of course to be altered and modified on grounds of practical expediency. In contemplating the constitution of the regular army, the nature of that relation which exists between a private and his officer, when attentively examined, will be found to exhibit a very striking illustration of the doctrines which have been already premised, and will clearly prove that it is not so much on mechanical dexterity, as on the acquisition of peculiar moral habitudes, that the distinctive superiority of disciplined troops incontestibly depends. As those moral habitudes are in a great measure artificial, and as their progress is impeded by the prevailing dispositions of the human mind, they must be created and supported by the unintermitted action of very powerful causes. For this purpose the power of an officer is absolute and complete, and the mutual connexion between him and those whom he commands, is fixed by an irrevocable obligation. He can resort also in extreme cases to the coercion of rigorous punishment; an authority of which the frequent use

is not only odious, but very inexpedient * ; but, of which the possession is absolutely necessary, not only for creating and strengthening the infant feeling of obedience, till it acquires the force of a fixed habit ; but for facilitating the operation of other principles, which acting upon the mind by a more grateful influence, soften the original rigour of military relations, and eventually lead to the most heroic exertions of voluntary zeal. The fear of punishment is, however, the primary spring of obedience ; honour, though it rises higher than the source from which it flows, and by addressing man as a moral agent, is unlimited in its effects, is only a secondary principle. In all political structures, indeed, however splendid their external appearance, we uniformly find that the foundation is formed of the same coarse materials. On examining that process of moral culture which the mind of a soldier receives before it is thoroughly

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* That portion of Sir R. Wilson's work, which relates to the infliction of punishment, not only displays singular benevolence and humanity, but contains many sound and judicious observations susceptible of a more general application. The known experience of the author on the subjects on which he treats, and the manly independence with which he declares his sentiments, give a weight and importance to his opinions, which naked deductions of principle never can possess. There is a lurking propensity among mankind to disregard theoretical speculations. However well founded they may be, they are generally classed with those ingenious refinements of philosophy, which are of no practical utility.

subjected, it will be found that all the regulations of the regular army are relative to two principles, fear and honour.

When the raw recruit is first placed under the care of a drill-serjeant, he has the firm conviction impressed upon his mind, that obedience can be enforced by punishment, and all the instructions which he receives tend to strengthen him in this belief, and to train him to a familiarity with the peremptory decrees of martial law. Submission to orders is not merely inculcated by a naked catalogue of dry precepts ; strong motives to action never can arise from a knowledge of duty merely theoretical ; in order thoroughly to subject men to the control of discipline, their minds must be rendered constantly conversant with authority which admits neither of modification nor dispute. For this purpose it is of essential importance in the economy of the regular army, to enjoin the strictest attention to commands apparently trivial ; to exact the most rigorous compliance with forms and etiquette, not surely on account of their abstract and individual importance ; but, because a constant, punctilious observance of orders in the minutiae of discipline tends to secure obedience on more perilous and important occasions. It brings the man constantly under the eye of his officer ; it forces him perpetually into a contact with his power ; it gives substance to theoretical rules, by connecting them

them with practical regulations ; it preserves the control of authority in perpetual vigour, by rendering it plain and palpable to the sense ; and multiplies and strengthens those ties by which military discipline at length enchains the mind. An officer, is therefore, placed with respect to his men, in the most commanding position which can well be conceived ; he is the dispenser of rewards and punishments ; and it is not surprising that he at length obtains a complete ascendancy over their minds. Power being thus placed on a secure foundation, it is the province of political skill, by stripping it of its terrors, to conciliate those whom it subjects, and to create in its favour artificial supports drawn from passions congenial to the human mind. These supports very naturally grow out of military subjection ; for, as it is of all others the most odious and disgraceful situation to live in habitual dread of punishment ; and, as a zealous and active service never can spring from terror, the mind very naturally opens to an ambitious desire of gaining the good-will and esteem, of those who must otherwise inspire emotions ungrateful in the extreme. There is besides a propensity in human nature to admire the heroic intrepidity of those who boldly expose themselves to danger. Where there is a propensity to admire, there will be a disposition to imitate. It is by carefully cultivating this disposition, that honour is gradually brought to perfection.

It cannot be doubted however that it rests on power as its foundation ; for whatever collateral aids it may receive, it is only by the control of martial law, that the intractable passions of mankind can ever be moulded into habits so adverse to the genuine feelings of nature. The situation of soldiers rendering them therefore, accessible to the influence of this principle, various means are devised for fostering its growth. They are instructed to pay a scrupulous regard to personal cleanliness, to keep their bodies in an erect attitude, and to execute all their motions with a certain precision and alertness. They are separated from the common people, by the distinction of a more showy dress, and are taught to consider themselves as consecrated to a more honourable service. All these minutiae of discipline are in themselves trifling and useless, for, it is not supposed, that a slovenly appearance, or an awkward or stooping gait, or a plain and sober garb, detract from the physical powers of the human body. But they are to be considered as leading to a more important end ; as tending to create in the mind of the young soldier a principle of honour, which is a nobler and far more efficacious motive of action than the dread of power. His affections are gradually engaged by the imposing splendour of a military life, by the regular gradation of rank and honour, by the solemnity of public exhibitions, by music, by decorations, and by all the pride, pomp, and circumstance, that accompany the arrangements

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of war. He begins to take a pride in performing with correctness and celerity the most complicated evolutions, his duty becomes a pleasure ; he is familiarised to warlike associations, and being constantly in the society of his comrades, he hears with eager wonder tales of past difficulties and hardships, imbibes their habits of thinking, and glows with the same feelings of martial enthusiasm. His passions throw brilliant colours over those scenes of peril and adventure which chequer a soldier's hazardous career. The dangers of war, far from appearing to him thro' the medium of despondency and gloom, form the most conspicuous and splendid objects in the visionary pictures of his enraptured fancy. Such are the effects of this wonderful principle, when it is judiciously managed, and brought to bear with a vigorous and constant action upon the mind.

Honour, however, though a far more effective spring than fear, requires to be constantly invigorated by its influence ; if the restraint of martial law were withdrawn, the old inveterate habits of nature would at length recur, and the frail fabric raised with so much care, and upheld by so many artificial supports, would soon crumble into pieces. Honour by disarming authority of its terrors, operates as a corrective to its noxious effects, while authority keeps alive the principle of honour, and prevents the mind from springing back to the direction from which it was originally bent. It does not appear, however, that

that we are ever enabled by any process of moral discipline to effect any fundamental change in the radical dispositions of our nature. Accordingly, those who in trying scenes of danger, where they were supported by a variety of auxiliary principles, have behaved with undaunted fortitude, when placed in different circumstances, and left to the unassisted influence of their own feelings, have betrayed unequivocal symptoms of alarm and dismay. Soldiers who have secured an honourable character by their conduct in the field, have been totally overpowered by the terrors of a storm at sea. This proves beyond a doubt, that their former steadiness had been wholly owing to the preliminary training which they had received, and that it is vain to expect, without the formation of powerful habits, that men can encounter danger with coolness and intrepidity. In a storm a soldier has no adventitious supports to which he can cling; he is neither controlled by authority, nor by the dread of losing his character and honour; and, he is besides, not at all accustomed to the associations connected with this new and peculiar mode of peril. The terror which he feels, obviously results from the want of previous training, which is necessary to fortify the mind in the hour of danger.

As honour becomes a predominating principle in the relations of military subordination, they assume
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a different character, their natural rigour is softened, and both the soldier and his officer are disposed to indulge in mutual sentiments of affection and attachment. All those relations in society which to the individuals concerned are of primary importance, have a tendency to produce a desire of mutual conciliation, which manifests itself in an interchange of good offices. In this respect the officers of the regular army possess peculiar advantages. When a man becomes a soldier he is in general withdrawn from that circle of friendship or patronage, where he could look for advice or assistance in those temporary embarrassments, by which human life is so frequently distressed. All the social relations in which he formerly stood being thus dissolved, or at least, rendered wholly nugatory as to any view of immediate utility, to whom can he apply for advice in straits or difficulties, or for protection against injustice and oppression, but to those with whom he is connected by the ties of military subordination, and who are qualified to assist him with their council, or to interpose by the weight of their rank to vindicate his rights. Hence arises a reciprocal inclination to indulge those social feelings of kindness and good-will, to which the heart easily gives way, when it is left to the influence of its own native sympathy. Frequent opportunities must occur, more particularly in the operations of active warfare, for calling forth and cherish-

cherishing the affections of soldiers, both by an equal participation in all those dangers to which a military life is exposed, and by endeavouring in every possible way to alleviate the hardships of their lot. By this mode of treatment it is possible to inspire men with a degree of enthusiasm which neither threats nor punishment can ever produce.

The happiness and comfort of a soldier depends indeed in many essential points on the character of his officers, and wherever the true nature of discipline is understood by those who are invested with military authority, the affection of the soldiers will be converted into an effective principle of action. It is true indeed that an army may be brought to a very high degree of perfection by the operation of honour alone, but military discipline must undoubtedly lay a faster hold of the mind when the influence of personal attachment is superadded to that of honour. Honour is the general characteristic of all armies; without this indispensable constituent of the military character, men may indeed be assembled into battalions, but they must be totally useless in the operations of war. Yet altho' honour may exist where there is comparatively little affection, it is difficult to conceive how affection can exist in any army, where authority has been at the same time maintained in its genuine vigour, without a corresponding degree of enthusiasm. Discipline therefore is
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most perfect, where authority is softened by honour and affection, and the soldier gradually attains under this mode of training to the highest possible excellence in his profession. The artificial principles created in his mind, predominate over those on which they were originally engrafted, and all those habits which are necessary to the perfection of his character, are incorporated with the constituent feelings of his soul.

These observations are meant, however, to apply rather to the spirit of the military profession, than to convey an accurate idea of the perfection, to which in all cases regular troops actually attain. In all institutions of authority, there must exist a certain portion of power, which it is impossible to limit by positive checks, and which must of course be entrusted to the discretion of the individual by whom it is held. Wherever discretionary power exists, it will occasionally be abused by weakness, or prostituted to the gratification of passion. In armies, as in all other departments of political power, men are often either ignorant how to direct that authority with which they are entrusted to its proper end, or they abuse and pervert it to purposes foreign to its nature and original design. Impelled by a mistaken zeal, or by their own evil dispositions, they indulge their passions in the infliction of unnecessary severities, or they render their power instrumental in procuring to them-

selves low and selfish indulgencies, and in stifling the indignation and contempt, which such meanness in men of high rank never fails to produce. No abuse is more injurious to discipline, than when military power, instead of being employed in promoting the end for which it was constituted, is rendered subservient in whatever way to individual gratification; by encroaching either on the rights, privileges, or comforts of those who are placed under its subjection. Not only does it tend to create an opposition of interests, and to give rise to feelings of hatred, suspicion, and distrust, between those whose hearty co-operation is necessary for the attainment of one common object, but it lays the foundation of vile distinctions; it introduces and even renders necessary, a system of increased rigour; it thus extinguishes affection and blasts the growth of honour; it teaches men the vices of slaves rather than the virtues of soldiers; renders them mean and abject; instructs them in craft and duplicity and in all those despicable arts by which they are at last qualified to excel in the pitiful scramble of selfishness, instead of being allured into an enthusiasm for military glory. It is evident that those who are guilty of tyranny or oppression, must preserve their authority chiefly by the naked operation of terror alone. They cannot lean upon honour for support, and still less upon affection. Honour growing originally out of the fear of disgrace

disgrace, cannot exist in its genuine perfection, unless where it conciliates confidence and commands respect. Every act of unnecessary severity, therefore, every capricious exercise of power may be said more or less to injure discipline, and to deprive it of its surest supports ; it may be laid down indeed as a general principle, that the predominance of terror in the relations of military subordination tends, by degrading the soldier's character, to render him careless and inanimate in the performance of his duty, and impedes instead of promoting, the formation of those peculiar habits by which his mind is gradually fitted to endure with alacrity, the peculiar evils of his profession. Men may be overawed by tyranny and oppression into an adherence to the strict letter of their duty, but it is impossible amid threats and punishments to preserve that " proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart," which superadds to the cold obligations of duty, the powerful influence of voluntary zeal.

It is only by the skilful application of moral correctives that the higher virtues of the military character can be drawn forth. Temporary disgrace, or loss of favour, or any of those restraints which address man as a moral agent, are infinitely better calculated to unfold its perfections than rigorous punishment. As they do not degrade those to whom they are applied, nor exclude them from the hope of retrieving their

lost importance, they naturally tend to animate them to fresh exertions, and to inspire them with renovated zeal. It is impossible to imagine a more powerful principle of action than a sense of humiliation operating on a mind tremblingly alive to the feelings of honour; men who have been long accustomed to this sort of training, attain to the highest degree of excellence in their profession, and do often realise the most stupendous revolutions in the aspect of the political world. They are powerful instruments in the hands of patriots or tyrants to vindicate or oppress the liberties of man. Wherever on the contrary punishments are frequent, the minds of soldiers must be degraded, and however they may recommend themselves by their external appearance, or even by dexterity of manœuvres, they can never under this sort of management, attain the essential constituents of the soldier's character. The fear of shame is peculiarly characteristic of rational nature; but the apprehension of mere physical pain is a control fit only for a brute, or for those hardened criminals who are beyond the reach of every lenient corrective.

It appears to be so plain and obvious that the perfection of military discipline necessarily depends on a judicious use of moral restraints in preference to the actual infliction of punishment, that it is hardly necessary

cessary to refer to the evidence of experience for a
 farther corroboration of the preceding reasonings.
 It may not however be wholly superfluous shortly to
 notice the observations of an eminent writer respect-
 ing the character of the Russian army, as his reason-
 ings if well founded would lead to a very different,
 and I may add, to a very unaccountable, conclusion,
 on this subject. It is with considerable diffidence
 that I offer any remark on the opinion of an author
 who appears to add to an acquaintance with general
 principles, a practical knowledge of tactics ; yet I
 cannot help thinking that he has misapprehended
 the nature of Russian discipline. “ Le soldat Russe
 “ (he observes) manque d’instruction plutot que d’in-
 “ telligence : l’obéissance fervile, a laquelle il est ha-
 “ bitué des sa naissance, la discipline rigoureuse des
 “ armées, la separation absolue de toutes les nations
 “ civilisées, dont la langue, et les usages lui sont en-
 “ tierement inconnus, font qu’il n’y a pas au monde
 “ du soldat plus obéissant a ses Officiers, plus patient,
 “ et plus endurant. Le courage est l’esprit general ;
 “ c’est dirai-je, la foi, et la croyance des soldats Rus-
 “ ses. L’obéissance aveugle produit en eux les memes
 “ effets que ceux du patriotisme le plus ardent ;
 “ ils sont plus surs et plus durables que ceux de l’en-
 “ thousiasme, dont la chaleur factice ne peut se con-
 “ server longtems. Ainsi ce que les Philosophes ap-
 “ pellent

“ pellent le degré extrême de dégradation, place
 “ l’homme au même niveau que l’héroïsme *.”

It is very possible that the servile obedience to which the Russian peasant is inured, may render him accessible to the influence of enthusiasm and affection, under a system of discipline which would crush those principles in the minds of men accustomed to the enjoyment of civil privileges ; but it does by no means follow, that the heroic qualities of the Russian troops are in the slightest degree to be ascribed to that debasing servitude to which they are subjected. The principle of obedience can never exist in any degree of vigour, unless where it is incorporated with the passions and affections. Discipline depends for its perfection on the operation of three distinct principles, fear, honour, and affection ; authority may indeed be preserved, in common cases, by the pure influence of terror alone ; but in seasons of danger, power loses its terrors, and the mind

* The Russian soldier is deficient in instruction rather than intelligence ; the servile obedience, to which he is accustomed from his birth, the rigorous discipline of the army, and his absolute separation from all other nations, (whose language and manners are totally unknown to him) make him more obedient to his officers, and more patient and hardy, than the soldier of any other service. Courage is the general characteristic ; it is, if we may so express ourselves, the faith and creed of the Russian soldier. Implicit obedience occasions in him the same effects, that enthusiasm does in other nations. The effect, which servitude produces, is in this instance, the same with that of the most ardent patriotism ; it is more sure and durable than that of enthusiasm ; the artificial warmth of which cannot be long kept up. Thus, what by philosophers is called the last state of degradation, places man on the same level with heroism. *Military Character of the European Armies*, p. 139, 140

unless it were supported by enthusiasm and encouraged by affection, would inevitably sink under the powerful impressions of impending peril.

In the system of discipline adopted in the Russian army, it does not appear that any of those precautions are neglected, which tend to strengthen the principle of obedience. The great excellence of Suwarrow, consisted in cementing the relations of military subordination by enthusiasm, and personal attachment ; and he particularly demonstrated the superiority of his method, when at the long battle of the Trebia, he rallied a body of Russians who were retiring, and brought them back to the charge ; not by threatening them with the severe effects of discipline in case they disobeyed his orders, but by a forcible and successful appeal to their affection. There are besides other regulations in the constitution of the Russian army, which are directly relative to the principle of honour.

“ Dans chaque compagnie, il y a un brave ; c’est
 “ un rang qu’il obtient du suffrage de ses camarades ;
 “ il n’a aucun prééminence déterminée par les régle-
 “ mens, mais elle est en effet très grande : il est l’ex-
 “ emple, le modèle, le chef de la chambrée ; il jouit
 “ d’une grande considération parmi ses camarades, et
 “ il ne manque jamais de leur donner l’exemple de
 “ la bravoure, de la fermeté, et de la bonne con-
 “ duite

“ duite. Lorsque les hommes sont accoutumés à
 “ quelque chose, il suffit qu’un seul donne l’exemple
 “ pour que tous le suivent : c’est ce
 “ qui rend ce brave si utile dans les combats : peu de
 “ gens sont capables de donner l’exemple, presque
 “ tous le font de le suivre *.”

These regulations are undoubtedly intended to inspire the soldiers with enthusiasm, and they are admirably calculated to produce the desired effect. They shew plainly, that the astonishing perfection of the Russian troops, depends very much on elevated sentiments, and afford a satisfactory refutation of that strange and paradoxical assertion, that the last state of degradation, places men on the same level with heroism. It is impossible that men can be in the lowest state of degradation, under a system of discipline in which the principle of honour is so studiously cherished ; or indeed, that in such a state, they could ever acquire the peculiar virtues of the military character.

* Each company has its hero, it is a distinction which he obtains from the suffrages of his comrades ; he has no preeminence determined by order, tho’ he has in effect a very great one ; he is the example, the model, and the chief of the mess ; he enjoys great consideration among his comrades ; and never fails to give them an example of bravery, firmness, and of good conduct. When men are accustomed to any thing, it is sufficient for one to give an example to induce the others to follow it, this it is that renders the hero in question so useful in action ; few persons are capable of setting an example, tho’ almost all are capable of following it. *Military Character, &c.* p. 145.

The wisest system of military regulations must, however, depend in a great measure for its practical effect, on those who are entrusted with its execution. It cannot be expected that soldiers can ever acquire those moral habitudes which qualify them for the duties of active warfare, under the management of weak men, who, almost at every step, contravene the spirit of military discipline. The virtues of the soldier's character can never be unfolded in their genuine lustre, except under a leader of extensive capacity, who fully comprehends the nature of his charge, and avails himself of all those auxiliary principles, which, by mitigating the rigour of power, strengthen its controul over the mind. All those extraordinary personages, who have achieved exploits which astonished the age in which they lived, and still reflect splendour on their names, must have relied almost entirely on their own personal qualities for the promoting of voluntary ardour.—They must have trained their soldiers to habits of zealous and active service ; they must have touched their enthusiasm, and have laid hold of their affections ; they must have taught them, in some degree, to identify their own glory with that of their commander, by mingling gentleness with authority, by studying their comforts, and above all, by taking part with them in hardship and danger. In all extraordinary and hazardous enterprizes, discipline is required to make its greatest efforts, and it must be as-

sisted in every possible way. The influence of great talents is indispensably necessary, as a source both of confidence and of restraint ; in scenes of unlooked for difficulties, it would be impossible, were it even expedient, to uphold power by its own terrors ; other and more effectual means must be resorted to for controuling the mind, and at the same time for invigorating all its faculties ; these means will be found partly in the natural ascendancy of great capacity, and partly in a judicious management of all the milder correctives of moral discipline ; power must be stripped of its sternness by gentle and affectionate usage ; the principle of obedience must be connected with those passions, which, by exalting the mind, expand its energies ; it must be incorporated with all those social charities, by whose kindly influence the dread of authority is softened into personal attachment, and reverential awe. It must be the first and principal study, indeed, of all those who have in view the execution of arduous enterprizes, to strengthen by every possible tie the principle of subordination. A general who has conducted his troops through difficulties of a new and unusual nature, and has preserved at the same time authority, in its natural soundness and vigour, exhibits an incontestable proof of extraordinary talents. The admiration which the Roman historian expresses of Hannibal's superior capacity in the management of his soldiers, is rational and just ; the passage may be quoted as a forcible

forcible illustration of the preceding reasonings, and as exhibiting an animated picture of that sort of discipline which arises from the all-powerful ascendancy of an uncommon genius. *Ac nescio, an mirabilior fuit adversis, quam secundis rebus. Quippe qui quum et in hostium terra per annos tredecim tam procul ab domo varia fortuna bellum gereret, exercitu non suo civili, sed misto ex colluvione omnium gentium, quibus, non lex, non mos, non lingua, communis ; alius habitus, alia vestis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra, alii prope dii essent ; ita quondam uno vinculo copulaverit eos, ut nulla nec inter ipsos, nec adversus ducem seditio, extiterit, quum et pecunia, sæpe in stipendium, et commeatus in hostium agro deessent.*

Hannibal must have carried discipline to a very high degree of perfection before he could have so completely subjected such a host of fierce barbarians to its controul ; more particularly when it is considered what unexampled hardships they endured, and to what diversities of untried peril they were exposed, in a tedious march through barbarous nations, and unexplored deserts. Personal admiration and attachment must have formed the chief bond of union between Hannibal and his troops ; he appears, indeed, to have combined in his character all those qualities which inspire soldiers with confidence, affection, and enthusiasm. Simple in his dress, and strictly temperate in his habits, he participated with the hardest

veteran in all the toils and dangers of war. The time which remained after a vigilant observance of his military duties, he allotted to repose, which he courted, not on a downy pillow and in the silence of retirement, but on the bare ground, covered with his cloak, and in the hurry and bustle of the camp. He was endowed with an unconquerable fortitude of mind, which eminently qualified him for the execution of the most perilous enterprizes, and by the courage and capacity which he uniformly displayed, he gained the confidence of his followers, and infused into their hearts a portion of that heroic fire which animated his own. Almost immediately on his arrival in the Carthaginian army, his appearance created a strong and general prepossession in his favour. His great qualities enabled him to mature those favourable impressions into a firm and lasting attachment, and to preserve unshaken the fidelity of his soldiers “ thro’ all the varying fortunes of his vast and hazardous career.”

To gain the affections of soldiers, may be said to be one of the most important duties of a general; accordingly all great commanders have been particularly remarkable for awakening the enthusiasm, and conciliating the attachment of their troops, by studying their comforts, participating and alleviating their hardships, and in short by all those soothing attentions
with

with which an enlightened mind, and a benevolent heart, naturally endeavours to mitigate the lot of dependents or inferiors. It is related of General de Zieten, the friend and companion of Frederick the Great, that he not only participated in all the privations to which his soldiers were exposed, but that he would often visit the camp on foot, or on horse-back, addressing the soldiers by the name of "comrades," and inviting them to come out of their tents. He was frequently seen to alight from his horse, and converse with his veteran grenadiers; he chased desponding thoughts from their minds, by his soothing consolations, and kept alive their enthusiasm while they were suffering the utmost extremity of cold, hunger, sickness, and fatigue. So much was he beloved by his troops, that he was known throughout the whole army by the name of Father, and his whole system of discipline tended to cherish this pleasing illusion. Zieten relied, even in the most perilous extremities, entirely on the effect of gentle measures for the preservation of his authority, and he had frequent opportunities of demonstrating the superiority of his method*.

Of

* By the influence of mildness and conciliation, he rallied a body of cavalry, who had been seized with a panic, and threatened in their flight to bear down all opposition. He was urged to stop the fugitives by force, and to cut down some of them by way of example; he refused, however, to listen to these violent counsels, but proceeded in his own way, and by calmly and resolutely exhorting them to their duty, he succeeded in

Of all modern commanders, Suwarrow appears to have been most successful in incorporating into discipline, the influence of personal talents. His mode of managing his troops was in many respects completely original, and if we may judge by its astonishing effects, it must have been admirably adapted to unfold the higher perfections of the military character. Like all great generals, he seems to have superseded the necessity of harsh discipline, by inspiring his men with an unbounded confidence in his capacity, and by laying hold of their enthusiasm and affections. They believed him to have intercourse with superior beings, and that it was impossible they could be overcome while they were led on by an inspired man. This superstitious belief, so admirably calculated to gain the confidence of his men, was strengthened and encouraged by the eccentricities of Suwarrow's character, and the singularity of his manners. The author of the *Military Character of the European Armies*, draws the following interesting portrait of this extraordinary personage. "Suwarrow étoit âgé
 "et usé, lorsqu'il vint en Italie, mais son esprit avoit
 "conservé son feu et sa vivacité : tout étoit singulier
 "et bizarre dans ses manieres. Il baisoit la main de
 "ceux

in inspiring fresh confidence into his dispirited troops. He then drew his sabre, and putting himself at their head, cried out, "March;" and ordering the trumpets to sound a charge, he cast his eyes along the whole line, and marked the ardour which glowed in the countenance of every soldier.—*Life of De Zieten.*

“ ceux qu’il accueilloit, et même il les baïsoit ou aux
 “ joues, ou à la bouche. Un bâteleur ne fait pas au-
 “ tant de fingeries, de contorsions, et de grimaces que
 “ lui : il accompagnoit cela de signes de croix, et de
 “ prières. Sa table étoit remarquable par sa faleté,
 “ et sa mauvaise chere ; il buvoit dans le verre de
 “ son voisin et souvent ce qu’il y avoit laissé. On se
 “ feroit crû dans la tente d’un Khan Tartare, plu-
 “ tôt qu’au quartier général du Généralissime de deux
 “ armées impériales ; au milieu de toutes ces boufon-
 “ neries, qui, de la part de tout autre, eussent excité
 “ la risée et le mépris, on ne pouvoit se défendre de
 “ sentir autant de respect que d’étonnement.” The
 same author judiciously observes, “ Si les farces que
 “ Suwarrow jouoit, étoient le moyen le plus propre à
 “ donner à son armée la conviction de son inspiration,
 “ elles cessent d’être ridicules, et deviennent sageffe.
 “ On admire presque celui dont on étoit tenté de se
 “ moquer.”

It is very natural that superficial observers should endeavour to discredit the larger views of more comprehensive minds. Men of the most shallow conceptions are perfectly alive to the perception of that incongruity which must exist, wherever the connexion between the means and the end is but obscurely discerned ; but not being equally capable of reasoning on those general principles which link together particular facts, and give them a systematical direction,

they

they very naturally deride the more refined exertions of political skill, as chimerical and uselefs absurdities, merely because they do not accord with the grovelling minuteness of their own narrow views.

In other respects the character and manners of Suwarrow were equally singular. The same author already referred to observes, “Celui qui ne connoissant
 “ que les exploits du Suwarow, auroit vu un petit vieil-
 “ lard en chemise, ou avec des calecons seulement,
 “ allant à cheval ou à pied, sans chapeau durant la
 “ pluie, ou par le grand soleil, au milieu des troupes
 “ Russes, auroit cru voir un goujat de l’armée, c’é-
 “ toit Suwarow. Une intrépidité, supérieure à tous
 “ les dangers, un génie prompt et actif, le talent na-
 “ turel de la guerre, et un dévouement sans bornes à
 “ son prince, faisoient du Maréchal, un des plus
 “ grands hommes de guerre de son siècle.”

It is remarkable how studiously many great military commanders have rejected all appearance of pomp or parade in their external appearance, and how scrupulously they have exacted their full share in all the toils and dangers which are incident to a soldier’s life. It is related of Alexander, that his dress resembled that of a common soldier; and in drawing the character of Hannibal, Livy remarks the same peculiarity. Tacitus commends the military character of Vespasian in terms which are applicable

cable to almost every great general.—*Vespasianus acer militiæ, anteire agmen, locum castris capere, noctu diuque consilio, ac si res posceret, manu hostibus obniti, cibo fortuito, veste habituque vix a gregario milite discrepans.* The same author observes, in order to shew, that Otho, when he was forced to take up arms in defence of the imperial sceptre, assumed all the virtues of a real soldier.—*Nec ille segne aut corruptum luxu iter; sed lorica ferrea usus est, et ante signa pedester, horridus, incomptus.*

A voluntary rejection of all those privileges, immunities, and external distinctions, which are connected with a high station, is wonderfully calculated to gain the favour of inferiors. Wholly excluding the odious idea of an unequal participation of peril or hardship, such an abdication of what might be even rightfully claimed, lays a solid ground for confidence and attachment. In this view, the plainness and simplicity of Suwarrow's appearance, his apparent contempt of official parade, and the constancy with which he continued to the end of his days to share in common with the hardiest veteran in all the toils of war, must have been of incalculable advantage to him in winning the affections of his soldiers. The imposing splendour of military shew may be necessary to uphold the consequence of ordinary minds. But Suwarrow required no artificial aids to mark his superiority, or to vindicate his title to command. De-

parting, therefore, from a punctilious observance of the minutiae of discipline, which are only to be considered as means subservient to a more important end, and availing himself of the resources of his own powerful mind, for the perfection of the military character, he appears to have marshalled in his service all the most powerful passions of human nature. Superstition, enthusiasm, honour, and affection, were converted by him into effective principles of action. By their joint operation, he established the complete ascendancy of his own personal authority, and linked the controul of discipline to the primary affections of the heart. The superiority of his genius was principally manifested in the management of his soldiers, in touching their enthusiasm and affections, and infusing into their minds that heroic energy by which soldiers are enabled to stand firm in the shock and carnage of hostile battalions. The astonishing proficiency to which they had attained in all those qualities which constitute the perfection of the military character, superseded the necessity of that scientific skill which consists in a judicious arrangement of movements, and peculiarly fitted them for the bold and decisive operations of active hostility. The system of warfare adopted by Suwarrow was admirably adapted to the genius of his troops. According to the enlightened and judicious writer to whom I have already had occasion to refer, his tactics consisted principally in bringing the enemy to battle, being persuaded

ed that the valour of his troops would render him victorious. “ Chercher l’ennemi,” (he observes) “ et le charger, étoit l’abrégé de sa science militaire ; “ mais son grand caractère, et son génie militaire “ l’aidoit, et assuroient la victoire à la valeur de son “ armée.” On all occasions Suwarrow was aided by the affections of his troops ; it was their affection which rescued him from the most perilous extremities, and enabled him to preserve the palm of glory to the close of his brilliant career. His dependence on their attachment was very strikingly exemplified at the long and obstinate battle of the Trebia, when, observing a body of Russians making a retrograde movement, he lay down on the road, saying he would die on the spot, since his soldiers deserted him. The Russians, affected at seeing the melancholy condition of their old general, returned to the charge, and broke through the enemy.

As the object of all great military commanders appears to have been to inspire their troops with confidence in their capacity, to call forth their enthusiasm, and to conciliate their affection, their characters resemble each other in their principal features. It is absolutely necessary to mark those peculiarities which are common to all, as it is impossible, without particularly attending to the nature of that relation which exists between a soldier and his officer, to form a just conception of the characteristic qualities of a veteran force.

The Volunteer System.

IN the practical discussion of politics, a variety of incidental topics are necessarily intermingled with general observations ; these being applicable only to a transitory combination of circumstances, are in most cases forgotten along with the particular occasion from which they arose ; those reasonings, however, which are founded on comprehensive views of human affairs, and which depend on principles permanently affecting society, possess an intrinsic, and consequently a more durable importance ; they form a standing repository of legislative and political knowledge, and may at all times be usefully consulted by those who are desirous of enlarging their minds with general maxims of policy.

The arguments of those who were originally hostile to the volunteer system, being sometimes adapted to occasional circumstances, lost their importance as the objects at which they were pointed, either began to assume a different appearance, or to recede altogether from the view ; those more general reasonings, however, which were so skilfully urged on the merits of that question, and so happily illustrated,

excite

excite a more permanent interest, and will be found not only to bear forcibly on the point which they were intended particularly to illustrate, but to throw a steady light on the principles of the military science.

Those who have been in the habit of considering with attention the military arrangements of Britain, since the commencement of the present contest, must have observed, not only that her whole system of national defence has been constantly disturbed by the jarring operation of contradictory plans, but that the most pernicious expedients have been persisted in, in spite of the most plain and pointed arguments, until their mischievous consequences became at length too notorious to be concealed. All the objections which ultimately led to the abolition of those plans which originated out of the balloting system, were equally applicable to them in every stage of their transitory existence; yet, though they were often very ably urged by Mr. Windham, and those who were connected with him, they were totally disregarded, till the principle of discord, which lurked in every part of the system, was at length exasperated to such a degree of mischievous energy, that it became quite impracticable to conceal or counteract its effects. Now, it is certainly peculiarly hard, that, while the pernicious consequences of bad measures are so generally felt and acknowledged, they must yet continue in force till

fatal

fatal experience marks their destructive tendency, in characters too plain and legible to be mistaken, even by the blind partiality of their projectors.

The volunteer system appears to be nearly arrived at this extreme point—to have attained to that maturity of folly, when precedents serve rather as beacons to point out the right course, than as examples to copy. The conclusions derived against its utility from principle, have been fully ratified by the authority of experience. During the weak administration of Mr. Addington, the public mind might have been deluded with the fallacious idea, that the want of discipline, which was confessed on all hands to be a very prevalent defect in volunteer corps, was occasioned by accidental causes, and probably arose from a want of vigour in all the departments of the executive government ; but if under the administration of Mr. Pitt, whose great talents have never been questioned, the volunteers, so far from being improved, have relaxed in a very glaring manner in their attention to military duties, men of reflection will be apt to suspect, that the whole contrivance is fundamentally vitious and absurd.

If the view of regular discipline already premised, be formed on just views of the subject, then it is evident that absolute power is the only foundation on which a structure of military subordination can be solidly

solidly reared ; and that all provisions of inferior importance, though not, perhaps, directly relative to this essential principle, do yet indirectly originate from its influence, and derive their effects from its vigorous operation. In contriving, therefore, a system of discipline and instruction for any number of individuals, who may agree to train themselves to an inferior degree of proficiency in the use of arms, a wise statesman would first direct his attention to the nature of the controlling power which he possessed over them, in order that all subordinate regulations might cooperate with the principle from which they originate. The want of an efficient control is an inherent defect for which no effectual and permanent corrective can possibly be provided. The whole contrivance must be adapted to this its fundamental spring ; otherwise its subsequent movements will be languid and contradictory. Nothing can be more vain and foolish than to imagine that moral habitudes can be brought to any degree of perfection without the continued coercion of an efficient authority. It may be easily conceived, indeed, that the human mind cannot be forced into a direction purely artificial, and quite contrary to its natural bias, without the permanent influence of powerful causes. Under a control, therefore, of inferior efficacy, all those regulations which are relative to any of those moral habitudes, to the principle of honour for instance, and which derive their effect solely from

from the fundamental energy of a more vigorous system, are totally nugatory and useless.

In appreciating the merits of that plan of discipline and instruction which has been contrived for the perfection of the volunteer force, it will be necessary first to consider what is the nature and extent of that power by which this immense body can be controlled. At the period of its first formation, the apprehension of the ballot and the dread of invasion imparted a transitory vigour to the volunteer system. The ballot is now done away, and it is evident that the panic of invasion can only exert a temporary influence over men's minds. The dread of that calamity undoubtedly kindled an uncommon ardour throughout the whole nation. But no effectual plan was, or indeed, ever can, be devised for giving permanence to the fleeting irradiations of popular enthusiasm. No wise statesman would ever dream that an establishment could be permanent, which depended solely on the variable feelings of the multitude. The Volunteer System being founded on that zeal which arises from the transient influence of national alarm, must partake of the mutability of the principle, from which it originates, and its vigour must be impaired as the impressions of impending peril begin gradually to grow more weak. There does not exist in the constitution of the volunteer force any other control except that which arises from the temporary dread

dread of invasion ; the officer possesses no power by which he can command respect, or enforce obedience, no authority by which he can render his favour or approbation of the slightest consequence to those whom he is appointed to command. The connexion between a volunteer and his officer is intersected by so many other relations, that it never can rise into primary importance ; it never can be cemented, as in the regular army, by any of those secondary ties, which, though they relax the original bond, yet give it a more secure hold of the mind. Nothing appears therefore, to mark more strongly the total want of a discriminating mind, than the blind servility with which all the frippery and tinsel of the regular army has been so faithfully transferred to the Volunteers, without considering how radically dissimilar they are both in their character and circumstances from a force permanently kept up, and exclusively employed in military duties. A strict compliance with all the minutiae of discipline, where there exists at the same time a vigorous controul, tends to facilitate the developement of those auxiliary principles by which the main design of the system is promoted ; the trifling ceremonies of etiquette are means subsidiary to an important end ; they are parts of a great whole which must stand or fall with its fundamental supports. But in a body so constituted as the volunteers, where the private possesses the unqualified power of resigning, and of thus dis-

solving, for reasons wholly arbitrary, all connexion between him and his officer, the essential requisites for the formation of military habits do not exist. Where an officer is invested with no direct power over those whom he is appointed to instruct, it never can be expected that they will put themselves to any serious inconvenience, in order by acquiring perfection in discipline, to conciliate his favour ; more particularly, when their attention is distracted by a variety of more pressing avocations. How radically different is the constitution of the regular army ! There a soldier is placed under the eye of authority, which has power to punish, or reward ; his obedience to orders and his alacrity in executing them, resulting at first from a natural inclination to conciliate those on whom his happiness eminently depends, is formed at length into a habit, and the obligations of duty, being incorporated with the feelings of honour, are at last entirely divested of their natural harshness. All those regulations, therefore, which in the regular army are intended to act as collateral supports to authority and honour, are pointed to no determinate object in the volunteer system, where neither authority nor honour can have any existence. In the original structure from which they have been copied with such a stupid exactness they are elegant and appropriate ornaments, and they add materially to the solid strength of the building ; but they harmonise so ill with all the relative proportions of the new erection in which they have been so injudiciously placed,

placed, that the whole exhibits a most striking appearance of incongruity, mutilation, and deformity. Destitute, therefore, of all the genuine characteristics of an army, how foolish is it to cling with such fondness to the unsubstantial form, the inanimate resemblance, the mere husk and shell without the substance; when we know we cannot possess the real character, to indulge a puerile vanity, and decorate ourselves with the supposititious plumes !

The whole scheme of volunteer discipline is calculated to promote a gross and pernicious deception, and to impose upon careless observers, by training men to a mechanical mimicry of military operations. It seems indeed to be the great object of the system to promote perfection in all those trifles which are connected with shew, and which rather tend to render men a seemly spectacle to be gazed at, than to fit them for the real duties of war. It would be difficult in any other way to account for the absurd importance which in the volunteer service is attached to the trifling minutiae of parade, or for the ridiculous anxiety manifested upon all occasions for whatever tends to improve their external appearance. Dress in the regular army is of importance considered as an honorary distinction, and ought on that account to be generally attended to; but no man in his senses ever dreamed that those regulations which prescribed a uniformity of general appearance were

to be understood in the strictest possible acceptation of the terms in which they were conceived. A blind unsystematical observance of trifles is attended with no benefit even in the regular army, and is a sure mark of a vulgar and contracted mind. It cannot be too often stated, that the distinctive superiority of disciplined troops depends, not upon the attainment of mechanical dexterity in certain motions, but on the cultivation and perfection of moral qualities ; that those qualities can only be attained by a long process of strict discipline ; and that without the power of enforcing strict discipline, it is impossible to infuse into any body of men, that energy by which alone they can be enabled to withstand the shock of regular battalions, and amid all the destruction and carnage of a battle, to execute the necessary manœuvres with steadiness and regularity. The volunteers may attain to an inferior degree of perfection in that sort of military mimicry, to which so much attention seems to be paid ; but it seems to be the height of folly to indulge an expectation, that they ever can acquire those habits of mind which constitute by far the most important part of a soldier's character, when they want the principle from which discipline derives its energy and effect. It would be quite as reasonable to expect, that a passenger should return from a voyage, with the weather beaten face of an experienced sailor, as that the human mind should be forc-

ed without any controul into habitudes entirely artificial. Both suppositions are equally ridiculous, with this difference, however, that in the one case, the absurdity is evident to the coarse observation of sense ; in the other it can only be discerned by the exercise of a discriminating judgment.

In reviewing the arguments of those who were the most zealous admirers of the volunteer system, it is in vain that we look for any satisfactory answer to the radical objections which exist to a force so constituted. The question was never allowed to rest so much as it ought to have done on general grounds ; it was perpetually complicated with the particular circumstances under which the volunteer establishment originated ; and although it would be very unwise, in arranging the warlike resources of a great empire, totally to exclude the consideration of existing circumstances, yet it certainly is not very congenial to the spirit of an enlarged policy exclusively to adapt a system of defence to one mode of annoyance, which it is in the power of an enterprising enemy either to relinquish, or to render subservient to a more extended system of active hostility. By some indeed, and particularly by Mr. Pitt, the volunteer system was considered as capable of being converted “ into a system of solid permanent defence, “ into a source of great and extensive national energy. By persevering (he observes) in a wise system “ of discipline and instruction for the volunteers,

every

“ every year would afford an additional improve-
 “ ment, which in the end would defeat every at-
 “ tempt of an inveterate enemy, would enable us to
 “ continue, with spirit and confidence, the contest in
 “ which we are engaged, and conduct us to a long
 “ series of years of secure and honourable peace.”
 In his speech on the Army Estimates, he expatiates
 on the same topic. “ Looking at the nature and
 “ probable turns of the contest in which we are en-
 “ gaged, I wish to see that system of defence employ-
 “ ed, not merely for domestic security, but so matur-
 “ ed and regulated, as not only to carry the volun-
 “ teer corps to as high a degree of perfection as such
 “ bodies can be carried, but also to enable us to use
 “ the regular army in its full extent, in any way
 “ which circumstances might point out as eligible,
 “ either for annoying the enemy where they are af-
 “ failable by our separate efforts, or on a large scale,
 “ should a prospect open for contributing to the de-
 “ liverance of Europe from the oppression under
 “ which it groans, and for the reduction of that am-
 “ bitious power, by which the peace of the world
 “ is disturbed.”

Perhaps there is not a more general source of de-
 lusion, than where the fancy predominating over the
 calmer suggestions of reason, is prematurely allowed
 to contemplate the full accomplishment of its splendid
 visions, before the judgment has prepared the inter-
 mediate means by which they may be realised. In
 the

the fervid effusions of Mr. Pitt's eloquence, there certainly appears a propensity rather to dwell on visionary pictures of political prosperity, than clearly to point out the connexion between the preparatory measures adopted, and the end to be attained. If it was ever meant to send the regular army on foreign service, and to rely solely on the volunteers for the defence of the country, a distinct and pointed answer ought to have been given to the objections urged against the constitution of that force; reasons ought to have been adduced to prove, that those who were trained under the regulations of the volunteer establishment might be so far assimilated to veteran troops as to render them the fit depositaries of so important a trust. This point however always seems to be carefully avoided. "Into the principle of
 "the system, (Mr. Pitt observes) upon which the
 "force produced by this zeal has been constructed,
 "I shall not now enquire. That is a point which
 "has already been amply discussed, and satisfactorily
 "settled."

The radical objection to the volunteer system is grounded on the total want of an effective controul, by which military habits might be promoted; when or by whom this objection was answered, Mr. Pitt has not thought fit to explain, and it is impossible to find in the parliamentary discussions on the subject, the slightest trace of any argument relating to it. As the volunteers were acknowledged by their warmest
 and

and most enlightened advocates to be in a very imperfect state of discipline, and even to be extremely inadequate to the purpose for which they were intended, it was more particularly necessary to prove that these defects arose from accidental causes, and did not, as was asserted, necessarily result from the depravity inherent in their constitution. It was maintained indeed that the existing imperfections were susceptible of emendation, and various improvements were accordingly suggested by Mr. Pitt, all of which it will be very easy to prove, were either rendered impracticable by the fundamental regulations of the volunteer system, or they were founded on a glaring misconception of the true nature of military discipline.

The means which Mr. Pitt conceived to be necessary for the perfection of the volunteer force, were 1st, the opportunity of regular instruction, 2d, the securing attendance at drill, and 3d, the enforcing silence, steadiness &c. when at drill. In order to accomplish these purposes, he proposed, That each volunteer should subscribe regulations imposing fines on non attendance at drill, and rendering inattention at parades liable to arrest and detention before a magistrate, who should have the power of commuting any fine for a short imprisonment of two or three days ; that regular officers ought to be appointed to superintend and assist the disciplining of the volunteer corps ; and that the volunteers should be
invited

invited to go on permanent duty for two or three weeks, and that each man should receive 7s. per week besides his pay.

It must be confessed that the volunteer system would derive some degree of vigour from the first of these regulations, if it were practicable to carry it into execution. But while the unqualified right of resignation exists, it is ridiculous to dream of a compulsory controul. It is evident that the whole energy of the system must arise from the influence of voluntary zeal, and that all regulations for its perfection must ultimately resolve themselves into a dependance on this principle. Can any man rationally suppose that a volunteer would submit to be cashiered in such a harsh manner, to be tried before a magistrate, and detained in confinement, unless he were animated with a very extraordinary degree of ardour in the cause in which he is engaged ; a degree of ardour indeed which would be perfectly effectual to the end proposed without the aid of any external impulse. In short the unqualified right of resignation affects the volunteer system fundamentally, and all subsequent improvements must either be adapted to the nature of this regulation on which they are engrafted, or they will be perfectly nugatory in their operation, and will only exhibit in a more striking light the radical absurdity of the whole contrivance.

As to the second proposition, of Mr Pitt, namely the appointment of officers from the line to discipline

the volunteer force, it is difficult to conceive what benefit can result from such a measure, unless it were possible at the same time to invest the officers in question with the same authority over the volunteers which they possessed over their own soldiers. The imperfections of the volunteer system do not seem to arise from the incapacity of the officers ; of these a great majority are no doubt both ignorant and careless ; there are others however, perfectly well qualified for discharging the duties of their respective stations, were they invested with adequate authority. But their exertions, even if they were assisted by officers from the line, would be rendered nugatory by the innate depravity of a system, where professional skill, not being backed by the vigorous operation of martial law, is maimed and crippled in its most efficient members. A military officer without power may instruct men in a theoretical knowledge of their duty ; but he never can, by establishing the conviction of his authority, produce habits of obedience, or principles of honour, or any of those secondary ties, which rivet the original bond more securely upon the mind.

Of all the projects which have been contrived to give perfection to the volunteer force, the scheme of permanent duty appears to be the most absurd in its principle, and the most destructive in its effects. It combines all possible evil with as little good as the nature of things will allow. As it would be improper,
however

however, to circulate vague and unsupported invective against those measures of national defence, which were supported in every stage of their progress by the weight and influence of splendid talents, and ultimately received the sanction of parliamentary approbation, I shall endeavour by a comparative estimate of the benefits and inconveniencies likely to arise from this measure to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion concerning its expediency.

The evils attending this project are 1st, the expence to government, 2dly, the loss of productive industry, and the unspeakable distress arising to individuals from the total derangement or stagnation of their concerns, occasioned by such a dissolution of the most important relations of society.

It may not be very easy to obtain an accurate estimate of the expence which the scheme of permanent duty has actually cost government. Nor does this appear to be a very material point. By calculating the loss incurred on each man, in the additional pay, and in the interruption to industry, we shall be enabled to judge whether the service obtained be worth the price at which it is purchased. The pay of each volunteer on permanent duty, including other allowances and the marching guinea, amounts to 15s and 10d. per week. There is besides an additional weekly allowance of 2s. for each child under ten years of age. This, together with other expences, such as the transportation of baggage and the additional pay
of

of officers must increase the weekly expence of each man to one guinea. The loss resulting from the interruption of productive industry, it is impossible so correctly to ascertain. It cannot however be estimated at less than two guineas for three weeks, making altogether 5 guineas for each man. The ruinous effects arising from the complete derangement of the settled order of society, though not perhaps so easily reducible to the numerical accuracy of figures, as the expence to government or the positive loss to individuals, is however not less severely felt. Were the measure to be commuted for a tax, its operation would be sufficiently oppressive, but it is beyond all comparison more intolerable when to the partiality with which it presses upon a particular class of individuals, is added all the variety of mischief which must result from the execution of such an inconsiderate project. Had the measure in question been clearly proved to have been essentially connected with the national security, then indeed no narrow views of economy, no considerations of private suffering ought to have stood in its way. But no satisfactory proof was ever offered by its authors that it would be in any respect adequate to its object. They perpetually dwelt upon the accomplishment of their purpose as certain, instead of proving that the means adopted were likely to effect the end proposed. Mr. Pitt observed, that “ no scruple ought to be entertained about expending 2 or 300,000 guineas for the
“ attainment

“ attainment of so important an object as that increase
 “ of discipline in the volunteer corps, which would
 “ be attained by their assembling on permanent duty.
 “ No narrow economy ought to stand in the way of
 “ such an object, so material to the defence of the
 “ country.” This is by no means the ground on
 which the question ought to rest. If three weeks
 permanent duty would convert the volunteers into an
 effective force, there are it is to be believed, very few
 who would grudge to expend 2 or 300,000 guineas
 for the attainment of such an important object. The
 following observations of Mr. Windham exhibit a
 much juster view of the question. “ Much had been
 “ said” he observes “ of the little importance of ex-
 “ pence in such a case, but he did not entirely sub-
 “ scribe to such a doctrine. One great question
 “ to be considered, was, whether the objects propos-
 “ ed could not be got cheaper? Safety was a great
 “ and imposing sound; it was a thing of the last im-
 “ portance, but it ought to be recollected that the
 “ present discussion referred only to a chance of safe-
 “ ty, and that but a very bad one too; it was also
 “ fair to consider whether the chance of safety, they
 “ were about to purchase, was worth the money to be
 “ given for it. There were other objects on which
 “ the money might be laid out, and with far greater
 “ advantage; the expence of these things was the
 “ grand consideration; it was the very sinews of
 “ war; let them consider after all that they were
 always

“ always stopped by considerations of expence ;
 “ things went on smoothly, until the expence induced
 “ hesitation. There was a number of ways in which
 “ the sum of money under consideration might be
 “ better applied---to the amelioration of the regular
 “ army for instance ; that most effective species of our
 “ force might be in many ways advantaged by money, and incalculably greater benefit would be derived from applying the money in this way than
 “ to the present object.”

The object proposed by the authors of this measure, was to promote the discipline of the volunteer force. The advocates of the volunteer system seem never to have attained to a very accurate conception of the true nature of military discipline. Sometimes they suppose discipline to consist merely in the attainment of dexterity in the use of arms, or in the capacity of executing those evolutions which are necessary for the preservation of order in the movements of a numerous force, at other times military habits are mentioned, by which must be understood, those moral habitudes which enable the mind to await with patient fortitude the approach of peril *.

By

* Dr. Smith has very accurately marked the distinction between mechanical dexterity in the use of arms, and habits of ready obedience to command. To the first of these causes chiefly, he ascribes the decision of ancient battles. But it surely cannot be denied that all those moral habitudes, by whose combined influence the military character is formed, must have been peculiarly necessary to withstand that close and desperate shock by which an ancient battle must have been decided. It does not certainly require less courage to resist an impetuous charge of the bayonet than to receive the distant fire of musquetry. In modern warfare,

By placing the volunteers for three weeks on permanent duty, it is imagined that considerable progress will be made towards rendering them an efficient force. It is to be observed, however, that from the 21 days are to be deducted three Sundays on which the troops are not drilled, one day to march to their respective stations, and one to return, allow for rainy weather three days, in all eight days, which leaves only thirteen days. Allowing therefore the perfection of military discipline to consist in that mechanical precision, in which the volunteers are chiefly instructed, what progress can be made even in these comparatively trifling acquirements during such a short period? What benefit can be derived from the occasional superintendence of general officers during a transitory application of twelve days? In most cases the plan of sending the volunteers from their respective places of abode tended to no useful purpose. Many of them were drilled exactly in the same manner, and were forced after all to depend chiefly on their own officers for their farther improvement

Dr. Smith is of opinion that mechanical dexterity is of far less consequence, than habits of regularity, order, and prompt obedience. The following definition of discipline, and the observation connected with it, may be recommended to the advocates of the volunteer system. "In what is called *discipline, or in the habit of ready obedience*, a militia must be still more inferior to a standing army, than it may sometimes be in what is called *the manual exercise, or in the management and use of its arms*. But in modern war, the habit of ready and instant obedience is of much greater consequence than a considerable superiority in the management of arms. *Wealth of Nations* Vol. III. p. 59.

ment, with this difference, that in the one case they might have employed themselves, in the intervals between drilling, and in bad weather, in their ordinary occupations; but when they are sent from home, they must loiter about in idleness and are liable to be corrupted by all those vices of which idleness is a powerful predisposing cause. If however the excellence of a military force depends, not in a punctilious attention to contemptible minutiae, of easy acquisition, and of little value, but on the cultivation and perfection of those moral habitudes, which enable the mind resolutely to confront peril, and to bear patiently all those peculiar evils which are incident to the operations of war, the scheme of permanent duty is of all others the most puerile and ridiculous. To create dispositions, and to fix habits, requires a long and laborious process; it is indeed the nature of all moral habitudes, even after the seeds have been sown in the mind, to grow to maturity by very slow degrees; they require the most patient attention, and they must be fostered by a variety of collateral causes. Surely then nothing can be so wild and visionary as to suppose, that under a feeble controul, and with inexperienced officers, such a short period of duty can have the slightest tendency to promote the formation of military habits. The perfection of the regular soldier does not arise from his being permanently kept on duty; it is by the habitual controul of authority, that those habits are formed, by which he is qualified to execute the duties

of

of his profession ; the action of this controul on his mind is the efficient cause, and time is no doubt necessary for the full completion of its effect. But were its vigour in any degree relaxed, the virtues of the military character could not be drawn forth even in a permanent military establishment. Those therefore who imagine that military habits can be acquired by men sent from home in the finest weather, and placed for the short period of three weeks, under a feeble and precarious controul, appear to foster a most miserable delusion, irreconcilable both to principle and experience. It is much to be regretted, if they seriously think the project of permanent duty efficient for any useful purpose, that they do not explain the grounds of their belief ; for as the matter rests, it is impossible to discern, either in the original formation of the volunteer system, or in those crude contrivances for its perfection, the slightest traces of deliberate wisdom.

There is another mode of argument occasionally resorted to, which is singularly convenient for those who will not trouble themselves to understand the nature of the question. It consists in collecting the opinions of military officers, and placing the naked authority of their assertions against the pointed reasonings of those who condemn the volunteer system. Without meaning to detract from the weight of professional opinions, it does not appear to be reasonable that the bare assertion of any man ought to

to be implicitly received as a truth established beyond the reach of controversy, particularly in matters which do not perhaps depend very much on professional experience. A practical knowledge of tactics does not seem to be necessary for explaining the constitution of the volunteer system, or even for exhibiting a general view of military discipline. There is nothing anomalous in the constitution of an army; it is analogous to all other political constructions; to analyse it therefore into its constituent principles, seems more properly to come within the province of the philosophical enquirer, than of the foldier. The opinions of eminent military officers (were they even all unanimous, which is by no means the case) are liable to this objection, that they never can be founded on an accurate knowlege of facts. With respect to them the volunteers are like players on the stage. They are drawn out on a grand field day, for the purpose of displaying their military acquirements. The most careless are awed into a decent attention, and the coldest heart may possibly feel a momentary elevation, from the novelty and splendor of the scene. They perform their manœuvres with tolerable precision and correctness, and they form altogether a gay and pleasing spectacle. In this view there does not appear such a marked distinction between the volunteers and veteran troops, and they are accordingly reported to have made great progress in discipline, by which, however, must be understood
their

their proficiency in the manual and platoon exercise, for it would be absurd to pretend that military officers could form an estimate of the moral qualifications of troops, merely from observing their external appearance. It is perfectly plain that the excellence of the military character depends on the formation of certain mental habits ; that those habits do not spring up spontaneously in the mind, but must be produced by a system of peculiar discipline. As there exists no authority in the volunteer system, by which any sort of discipline can be enforced, it is surely very fair to conclude that the volunteers, whatever progress they may have made in mechanical dexterity, of which military officers are no doubt very competent judges, must be very defective in all those qualities which characterise effective troops.

The fundamental defect of the whole arrangement consists in the want of an efficient controul. This defect is wholly incurable ; for so loosely cemented are all its component parts, that the slightest pressure of authority would break into pieces the whole fabric. In the volunteer establishment we have brought together all the constituent elements, but we want the cementing principle to give them coherence and solidity. We have realised the fable of Prometheus. We have formed and combined all the different members of the body according to the rules of just proportion ; we have constructed a piece of correct mechanism, and given to it all the external
graces

graces of which mere matter is susceptible ; but we still want the principle of life to warm and animate the senseless image. Without any distinct knowledge of the materials which they possessed, the framers and contrivers of the volunteer system have jumbled them together into a heterogeneous mixture, and left it without compunction to the troubled operation of the hostile ingredients which it contained. The contrivance being founded on an intimate union of civil right with military duties, involves a radical contradiction ; it proposes to blend together principles which the nature of things has placed in eternal opposition, and to alter the form into which society has been cast by the operation of invariable laws. It is impossible therefore that the volunteers can ever attain to any proficiency in the most important requisites of discipline. They have been declared by those who are interested no doubt in propagating such a delusion, to be in a state of progressive improvement and unabated vigour ; but it is impossible for the blindest enthusiast to give credit to this assertion, when he observes the glaring relaxation, and indeed the almost complete abandonment of military duties which has already taken place. Have the volunteers improved in habits of obedience to command, in respect or deference to their officers, or in a punctual attendance at drill ? have their exertions to perfect themselves in discipline been invigorated by emulation

lation or by any other strong principle of action? These are the grounds on which their merits ought to be estimated, and while on every one of these, facts speak so strongly against them, general commendations on their proficiency are entitled to no regard. Their outward appearance may be ameliorated; they may have attained to some degree of expertness in those trifles which are connected with shew and parade; but in all the substantial qualities of an efficient military force they are deplorably deficient. Their attention is directed merely to the unimportant minutiae of discipline, while all that is material to the constitution of an army is neglected; like hypocrites in religion, scrupulously particular in the observance of external forms, but destitute of faith to animate them to good works.

To arrange into battallions troops of this description, which are only superficially assimilated to soldiers, and to place them in a line of battle, where they may be exposed to the impetuous and well supported charge of a force hardened by service and perfected by discipline, appears to be a rash and perilous experiment totally repugnant to those cautious maxims of policy by which plans of extensive national utility are gradually brought to perfection. To know the compass and capacity of his troops, and to adopt a mode of warfare suited to their genius and acquirements, is classed by the author of the *Military Character of the European Armies*, among the higher
 perfections

of a general. “ Connoître la capacité (he observes)
 “ et la portée de ces troupes, est une des qualités
 “ nécessaires à un général---c’est ce que distingue le
 “ général d’un maître de tactique, la génie militaire,
 “ de celui d’un major d’exercices.” One great excellence of Suwarrow consisted in forming a correct estimate of the character of his troops, and in adopting such a system of military operations as was well calculated to display their peculiar excellencies. Had Suwarrow attempted with an army inferior in discipline to execute such daring plans of hostility, defeat and utter ruin would have been the consequence. The mode of warfare practised by the Russians is only adapted to troops who have attained to the very highest perfection in discipline. According to the judicious author already referred to, “ Leur methode
 “ est de charger l’ennemi avec le bayonette en cou-
 “ rant, et criant *owri, owri*, aucune troupe au
 “ monde ne peut soutenir cette charge ; le feu ne
 “ ralentit leur impetuosit , ils attaquent une batterie
 “ de front, si cette voie est plus courte que de la
 “ tourner.”

The mode of warfare pursued by the French generals in the war which originated from the revolution, was only suited to troops who had attained to a very high degree of proficiency in the most essential military qualities. Instead of lines, they formed close columns, which they concentrated on certain points, and sometimes on one only. Being
 totally

totally regardless of the loss of men, provided they succeeded in their ultimate object, one brigade, after it was repulsed, was replaced by another, till by a succession of fresh assailants, and by reiterated attacks, they succeeded in carrying the contested post. That men who could advance with such intrepidity to an attack, undismayed by the defeat and carnage of their companions, must have been influenced by very powerful motives of action, no man can rationally doubt. But by what particular species of control, the French troops were tutored to such a degree of heroic energy, it may not be very easy to point out. It is impossible, in the depths of that chaos of confusion out of which the revolutionary army originated, to discover the general principles by whose peculiar combination it was brought to such a high degree of perfection. Honour, enthusiasm, terror, and despair, appear alternately to have exerted their influence over the French soldiers, and to have bound firmly together the elements of hostile factions, and all the other discordant materials of which the republican force was in a great measure formed *.

In contriving a system of operations for any military force, an error on the side of temerity is certainly the most fatal in its consequences. On this ground, general Mack has been severely censured for the undue confidence

* See *Caractère Militaire des Armées Européennes*, p. 16, 17.

confidence which he placed in the Neapolitan troops, who were completely inexperienced in war. The plan which he laid down might have been excellent, if he had possessed a more effective force to execute it. But the troops which he possessed, being but imperfectly disciplined, failed him in the hour of trial, and the consequence was, the loss of the kingdom of Naples. The Neapolitan army appears to have resembled the volunteers, in the shew of their external appearance, and in the absence of all military qualities.

As military operations must therefore be suited to the character of the troops by which they are to be executed, it is difficult to conceive how any sort of conjunction can be formed between a veteran force, and an immense promiscuous mass collected from all the various classes of society, doubtful even as to physical qualifications, and totally deficient in all those moral qualities which are essentially necessary for the perfection of the soldier's character. The regular force of Britain is allowed on all hands to be equal to any in Europe in those "incorporeal excellencies which constitute the soul of an army," to be fit for any service, however perilous, either to stand firm in the shock of battle, or to achieve the boldest operations of active hostility. But to what proficiency have the volunteers attained, except indeed, in a few trifling evolutions, in which three weeks or a months drilling is sufficient to perfect

fect any man of tolerable understanding. And do their admirers mean to maintain that this sort of mechanical dexterity will enable them to stand their ground along with regular troops? Do they imagine that discipline consists wholly in the theoretical knowledge of military manœuvres? It is evident that, if the regular army is to act in conjunction with the volunteers, its operations must either be clogged by the encumbrance of an inferior force, or the Volunteers must be appointed to services which they are not qualified to perform, and may involve in the event of their miscarriage, the defeat of the whole army. “No man,” said Mr. Fox, “will think me
 “apt to favour any system opposite to civil liberty;
 “but yet I cannot help saying, that nothing appears
 “to me more absurd than the idea of making men
 “effective soldiers for the resistance or attack of an
 “effective regular army, without martial law, and military discipline. By this project of the volunteers,
 “you send men to impede the movements of your regular force, which men might be employed most
 “usefully to annoy the enemy, in various ways, to
 “protect the villages, in fact, by other means to defend the invaded against the invader; but the battle in the field with the troops of the invader, must
 “be fought by your regular army.” This point has been more fully explained by Mr. Windham: “A
 “great mistake,” he observes, “seems to prevail
 “of supposing, that whatever possessed in itself a cer-

“tain degree of force or strength, must by its addi-
 “tion to any thing of the same description, produce
 “a degree of force more than would be found in
 “either of the parts separately, that strength added
 “to strength would always produce strength. But
 “this was evidently not so. If the addition supposed
 “ed was not judiciously made, weakness, instead of
 “strength, might be the consequence. No one could
 “doubt that a regiment of four or five hundred men,
 “volunteers or others, must possess some power of an-
 “noying the enemy. But was it sure that your
 “line would be strengthened, and your general
 “power of annoying and defeating the enemy be in-
 “creased by such an addition?—What was the rea-
 “son that in naval actions, frigates, and even fifty
 “gun ships, were not suffered to make part of the
 “line? Was it that fifty gun ships, or even frigates,
 “were of no force? That their balls did not hit
 “hard? That some of their guns were not even
 “heavier than a part of those which formed the bat-
 “tery of a ship of the line? By no means. It was,
 “he must conclude, because a line of battle at sea
 “was a species of machine, so constructed, as to re-
 “quire a certain proportionate strength in all its
 “parts, the failure of any one of which would draw
 “after it the failure of all the rest. The same was
 “the case with an army. There also was a line, and
 “which as might be collected from the very expres-
 “sion of “regiments of the line,” could be formed
 only

“ only of troops trained to a certain degree of disci-
 “ line and regularity. To form it otherwise, to
 “ put into the line corps, which from want of ex-
 “ perience or instruction, might not maintain the part
 “ of the action allotted to them, would not only be to
 “ endanger the whole by that particular failure, but
 “ might in a thousand other ways embarrass the ope-
 “ rations of an army, and defeat the plans of a com-
 “ mander. Manœuvres must be calculated upon
 “ supposed qualifications in the troops and officers
 “ who are to execute them. What must be the
 “ situation of a general, if, when directing the execu-
 “ tion of any pressing service, a hill suppose to be oc-
 “ cupied, a post to be maintained, a wood to be de-
 “ fended, a redoubt to be stormed, in a crisis which
 “ left no leisure for deliberation or enquiry, he must
 “ be comparing the characters of the different corps
 “ under his command, and be exposed, at last, to the
 “ uncertainties of troops, whose composition was un-
 “ known, whose conduct, in a day of action, was to be
 “ tried for the first time, and who in the mode of ser-
 “ vice now proposed to them, might involve in their
 “ defeat or miscarriage, the discomfiture of the whole
 “ army.”

The imprudence of conjoining raw levies with vete-
 ran troops, or indeed of placing any dependence on
 their exertions, is forcibly pointed out by the invari-
 able experience of history. It appears that wherever
 military commanders impelled by their own rashness,
 or driven by the necessities of their situation, have ex-
 posed

posed troops imperfectly disciplined to the attack of effective soldiers, that they have been uniformly, not partially checked, but utterly routed and dispersed *. To the irresistible superiority of a standing army, Dr. Smith ascribes all the great revolutions in the affairs of mankind, of which history has preserved any authentic record. While all those nations who have placed their reliance on troops imperfectly disciplined, have fallen a prey to the rapacity of ambition,

* Voltaire in his account of the battle of Ramillies, after enumerating the various faults which were committed by marshal Villeroy, in the management and disposition of his force, makes the following pertinent remarks. “Voilà ce que toute la France a dit ; et l’histoire est en partie le récit des opinions des hommes : mais ne devait on pas dire aussi que les troupes des alliés étoient mieux disciplinés, que leur confiance en leur chefs et en leurs succès passés leur inspiroit plus d’audace ? N’y eut il pas des régnens François, qui firent mal leur devoir ? et les bataillons les plus inébranlables au feu ne font ils pas la destinée des états ? L’armée François ne résista pas une demi-heure. On s’étoit battu près de huit heures à Höchstet, et on avoit tué près de huit mille hommes aux vainqueurs ; mais à la journée de Ramillies, on ne leur en tua pas deux mille cinq cents : ce fut une déroute totale.” It must be observed that the French infantry was almost destroyed at the battle of Blenheim ; so that a considerable proportion of the troops who fought the battle of Ramillies must have been new levies. According to Voltaire “des troupes de recrue, ni disciplinés, ni complètes étoient au centre.”

Hume has an observation somewhat similar on the event of the battle of Dunbar between Cromwell’s veterans and the new levies of the Scotch. “In this battle (he remarks) it was easily observed, that nothing, in military actions, can supply the place of discipline and experience ; and that in the presence of real danger, where men are not accustomed to it, the fumes of enthusiasm presently dissipate, and lose their influence. “The Scots tho’ double the number of the English, were soon put to flight, and pursued with great slaughter.---No victory could be more complete than this which was obtained by Cromwell.”

tion, an effective military force has uniformly proved both a source of internal strength and of extensive dominion.

As to the beneficial effects supposed to arise from the volunteer system, in promoting a military spirit among the people, it may be observed that if the original separation of the soldiers by means of military distinctions, was founded on just principles, the good effects of that policy must be counteracted by the indiscriminate prodigality with which the peculiar ornaments of a soldier have been lavished away, and by the mass of spurious rank to which the volunteer system has given birth. All the artificial distinctions in society derive their value entirely from their rarity ; they possess no native or intrinsic excellence, by which they can be secured from debasement, and in proportion as they are rendered common, they cease to be the objects of ambition. It is justly observed by the author of the Rambler that “ fame
“ power, and riches are only the names of relative
“ conditions, which imply the obscurity, dependance,
“ and poverty of greater numbers.” It would be impossible in every case to fix upon the predominating motive which impelled the individual to enlist. The most general inducement appears to be a love of honour, distinction, and shew, combined with the unsteady propensities of youth. The ostentation of a military dress, and all the pomp and parade connected with the business of war, undoubtedly tends to awaken
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the enthusiasm of the mind, and by rendering a soldier an object of peculiar interest, to create a love for his profession and character ; great part of the effect must however evidently arise from the novelty and uncommonness of the spectacle ; a distinction when it is rendered common, loses its nature and character. In this respect the volunteer system has completely depreciated the value of all those honorary badges, which in former times exclusively characterised the military profession. They are now displayed in such profusion, by peaceful citizens and mechanics, that as a ground of distinction, they are totally useless. Those therefore who have established the volunteer system, have virtually stripped the military profession of all those external graces by which the heart is gained, and the passions are kindled, and now they exhibit the marrowless skeleton to captivate affection, and conciliate love. All those inducements, therefore, which arose from the influence of ornamental and honorary distinctions, being withdrawn, the tendency to enter into the regular army must rather be checked than encouraged. It has been urged that a taste for warlike occupations may be created among the volunteers and that men may be thus induced to enlist. But motives of that sort can only exist, where a force is permanently kept up, not where men are drilled occasionally, and are consequently conversant only in the duties, not in the pleasures of a military life.

As the volunteer system appears therefore in every respect inadequate to its object, it would surely be wise policy to provide with timely caution a more effectual and permanent defence. Convinced at length of the impossibility of training men to the opposite habits of two different professions, let us not, rashly condemning the evidence of experience, peril our safety on the success of a dubious experiment. “What I would wish, (observed Mr. Fox) is to see all men in their proper places, the soldier in the army, the peasant in the country, and the people throughout in that situation, where they could be employed each in his proper department.” Such is the arrangement which society has spontaneously assumed ; it is the “array of truth and nature” from which things may be for a short time forced by causes transitory and accidental, but to which they must perpetually tend by the operation of immutable laws.

The Militia.

ALTHOUGH it must be confessed that all those questions which are connected with the national defence have lost somewhat of that interest which they derived from the agitation of temporary passions, yet it is very possible that we may on that account be better qualified to examine them with that caution and sobriety which their importance deserves. We have recovered from that irrational trepidation into which

we

we were thrown by the threat of invasion ; that blind precipitation, which characterised all our movements, appears to have abandoned us ; we are now capable of viewing with some degree of coolness the practical effect of our measures, and those projects which appeared, even in the early dawn of our returning faculties, to be peculiarly marked by preeminent folly and injustice, have been already relinquished. To feel alarm at a threatened calamity is undoubtedly a preliminary step towards its prevention ; but there is a degree of terror, which paralyzes the mental faculties, and gives rise to hurry and restless trepidation, instead of that coolness and deliberation which characterises rational alarm. It is evident that Britain, engaged in a contest with one of the most powerful nations in Europe, and exposing in her widely scattered territories a broad mark for the attacks of an enterprising enemy, must be exposed to various dangers besides those which result from actual invasion. An enlightened statesman would never therefore in the view of one among many possible evils, have crippled almost the whole force of a great state ; he would naturally have endeavoured to combine two objects, namely the attainment of internal security and the capacity of active hostility. The radical objection to a force so constituted as the militia or Army of Reserve, is its uselessness in the operations of offensive warfare ; it never can be employed in annoying the enemy, or in exalting in any way the nation-

al glory ; it never can be even employed, in the most pressing emergency, in cherishing or protecting those parts of the empire, on the prosperity of which the well being of the whole essentially depends. Even the end therefore to which it points, is utterly unworthy of a great and powerful nation, which can only preserve its character by rendering itself formidable, and by bringing its resources to bear upon its enemies with vigour and effect. It is indeed singularly ridiculous to threaten to repress the encroachments of an ambitious conqueror, and to provide for the purpose a force so clogged and disabled, that it never can be transferred to its natural theatre of action. The mode, too, by which this force is raised, is peculiarly objectionable, not only because it proceeds on the absurd and unfounded idea of personal service, but because it impedes the increase of the regular army, and thus dries up at its source the vital principle of national strength. There cannot be a more foolish or false idea than that of personal service. It is evident that the ballot operates as a partial tax on a certain class of individuals, who are selected as objects of taxation, not on any well founded distinction, but merely because they happen to be of a certain age. Those comprehensive regulations which are simple in the contrivance, and apply indiscriminately to all the various classes of society, are admirably suited to the capacity of certain ministers. They save the trouble of comparison, combination and selection ; they require no nice distinctions ;

tinctions ; no accurate classification of a multiplicity of different interests preparatory to a particular arrangement adapted to the circumstances of each, in the true and benevolent spirit of political equality. The science of politics has been always thought to be conversant in matters in the highest degree intricate and involved, and to give full scope to the exercise of the most comprehensive talents. By jumbling together a thousand contrarieties, and leaving the whole to the operation of a blind chance, the business of the legislator is reduced to a degree of simplicity hitherto unknown.

A short and simple detail of facts will exhibit in a very striking point of view the impolicy of all those plans to which the balloting system gave rise. The project for raising the army of reserve was opposed by Mr. Windham, both in its origin, and during the short period of its operation, precisely on those grounds on which it was ultimately abolished. He maintained that the recruiting for the regular army was already considerably impeded by the competition of bounties which then existed between different sorts of military service ; that if the project for raising the army of reserve were persisted in, those causes would operate with increased effect, and would at length destroy all hopes of an efficient military force. These objections were frequently urged, and were corroborated by an appeal to experience. It was however gravely asserted that the recruiting for the army was not checked by the high bounties, but

but that it was prosecuted with more success than at any former period ; which involved the following strange assertion, that men preferred a smaller bounty with more burdensome duties annexed to it, to a larger sum of money and lighter duties. When facts, however, became too plain to be distorted by false representations, it was at length discovered that high bounties did interfere with the recruiting for the regular army, and those who had been uniformly in defiance of common sense and of experience, the most strenuous advocates for the plan of the army of reserve, were forced to undertake the humiliating task of proposing a suspension of its operation, which afterwards ended in its total abolition. It is impossible to disprove the truth of this statement, and it certainly requires no commentary.

A force so constituted as the militia, with whatever skill and perseverance they may be trained, must still be defective in all those moral qualities, which are essential to the military character. The peculiar habits of a soldier are not to be acquired in the lap of indolence and peace ; they must be stamped upon his mind by the immediate presence of hardship and peril. From the general view of discipline already premised, it is evident that the personal influence of officers has a most important effect in deciding the character of a veteran force. Nothing can be conceived more hostile to enthusiasm, than where there exists a general want of confidence in the capacity of a commander. Accordingly it appears that all great
generals

generals have endeavoured in every possible way to conciliate the affections of their troops, and to cherish and generally to diffuse those feelings of confidence towards their leaders, without which it is impossible that soldiers can ever feel the powerful influence of voluntary zeal. They have effected their purpose chiefly by the courage, capacity, and presence of mind, which they have uniformly displayed in the midst of danger ; by an unwearied attention to the comforts of the soldier, by shewing on all occasions a zealous attachment to his character and profession, and by cheerfully participating in all the dangers and privations to which he is exposed. It is evident that no opportunity can occur except in the perilous emergencies of real service, for displaying those qualities which produce among troops confidence, enthusiasm, and affection. It is justly observed by the author I have already had occasion to mention, “ *qu’un camp de paix, qui n’est qu’un parade, ou l’on ne dispute que de joie, de plaisir, et de magnificence, est une école peu profitable pour la guerre.*”

The officers of the Militia can lay no claim to confidence from experience or capacity ; they enter upon the duties of a military life rather as an amusement than with any view of ever being exposed to the dangers of war ; they never can have an opportunity of inspiring enthusiasm by their own example, nor can the relations which exist between them and those who are placed under their command ever be softened by those reciprocal sympathies by which companions in danger

danger are mutually attached. What therefore, contributes in the day of battle, very materially to the strength and confidence of veteran troops, must in a force so constituted as the militia prove a source of distraction and weakness. This point has been forcibly explained by Mr. Windham. "The difference between the two services" he observes, "is founded on the eternal difference that must subsist between troops who always remain at home, and those who are placed from time to time in distant stations, between troops who have seen service and troops who, generally speaking, have not; between troops commanded by officers who have never acted with them in difficulties and dangers, who have never shewn because they have had no opportunity of shewing their title to command, by the valour which they have displayed, who can pretend to no experience, who can bring no authority from former reputation;---and troops, whose officers possess in themselves all these sources of ascendancy, and all these claims to respect. There is, moreover, a sort of soldier character, arising from a thousand causes, and acquired insensibly in the course of regular service, which will easily be distinguished by discerning eyes, and will furnish in general a marked discrimination between the Militia soldier, and the soldier of the line."

It is evident that the army is the only proper seminary of discipline, it is there only where the mind is exposed to the powerful and incessant action of those
moral

moral causes by which the military character is formed. A recruit who has been hitherto accustomed to the habits which are acquired in a peaceful occupation, when he first joins a battallion of veteran troops, enters among a class of men, whose ideas and feelings are totally opposite to his own. It is as impossible for him to live in their society without imbibing the same habits of thinking, as it would be to reside in a foreign country without adopting the language and manners of the inhabitants. It is quite contrary to the nature of social beings who are placed in the same circumstances, and who are held together by force or moral necessity, to live in habitual intercourse without some sort of harmony in their feelings and sentiments. Where men of this description are brought together, they will very soon separate without any desire to renew their connexion; but where their union is compulsory, their minds must be imperceptibly linked together by the bond of congenial feeling. The great power of manners in the formation of national character must be partly ascribed to the powerful sway which the social sympathies exert over the human mind. Were it possible for any individual to detach himself from the influence of that community of sentiment and feeling which pervades the society in which he lives, he might with some chance of success revolt from the controul of manners; but where the voice of society is in unison with the internal feelings of the heart, its jurisdiction over the mind is completely established. In the same manner

as the national character is affected by the influence of manners, the members of the various professions, which are to be found in civilized society, are formed by the operation upon their minds of that system of manners, which is established in each of the particular classes to which they belong. In that general community of sentiment and feeling, which subsists between the members of each profession, may be said to consist its genius and spirit. It is by a constant familiarity with professional men, and by a habitual exposure to the impressions produced by their censures and praises, that men begin gradually to acquire those habits of thinking, and that *esprit du corps*, by which they are at length qualified successfully to discharge the duties of their respective occupations. In the military profession the mind is formed partly by the action of a vigorous controul, and partly by the indirect, tho' not less important, influence of a corresponding system of manners. In the constitution of the militia, the necessary controul exists in its genuine vigour, and men may undoubtedly be held in complete subjection under the regulations of that establishment, but it is impossible that the principle of honour and enthusiasm can be matured to the same degree of perfection as in the regular army, where the effect of laws is facilitated by the operation of congenial manners. The habits and feelings of a soldier naturally arise out of the peculiar circumstances in which he is placed; the same character cannot be attained by men
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who are not exposed to the influence of the same moral causes. The principle of honour can never attain to its natural perfection except in the perilous professions ; it is absurd indeed to suppose that the mind will conform itself to peculiar habits, as long as it is placed in a situation where those habits are not required. A habitual exposure to peril is the discriminating feature of the military profession, and an unconditional submission to command an indispensable constituent of an effective force. The services of a real soldier are fettered by no timid restrictions. Being inured even in the peaceful enjoyments of society constantly to contemplate the dangers of war, his mind conforms itself to the circumstances in which he is placed, and he is always ready at the call of his country, to relinquish ease and pleasure, or to break thro' the ties of kindred, and to expose his life in unhealthy climes or upon hostile shores. In this material point the constitution of the militia is repugnant to the spirit of the military profession, and directly hostile to the growth of honour. A force, which by the very laws of its existence is debarred from the chance of ever meeting a foe, and which must consequently be only conversant in the pleasures, and not in the perils of a military life, must be very inferior in its character to real soldiers. Honour naturally courts danger, but where men are taught to claim as a privilege an exemption from the perilous duties of their profession, how can it be expected that they will ever be animated with any thing like the heroic energy

energy of soldiers. To confine troops at home, that they may not be exposed to danger, may be a very convenient regulation for procuring recruits, but as it deprives the profession of a soldier of its characteristic distinction, it is certainly ill calculated to diffuse among men an ardour for military glory. As an effective force, therefore, the Militia are liable to radical objections, and it seems impracticable, except under peculiar circumstances, to incorporate enthusiasm into the constitution of that establishment.

The erroneous opinions so generally entertained concerning the character of this species of force appear to have arisen from the habit of contrasting merely their external appearance with that of regular soldiers. It must be confessed indeed, that in point of dress, personal appearance, celerity, and accuracy of manœuvring, the difference may not be very perceptible. But the question is, whether they possess those moral qualities, which form the capital excellence of an army; whether they possess the enthusiasm of the military profession, the *as triplex circa pectus* by which men are enabled to await without dismay the approach of danger. It ought to be always recollected that it is only on the field of battle that the great qualities of a veteran force are brought into full display, and that it is by viewing them on this their natural element, actually engaged with the enemy, attacking with unabated ardour, after being repeatedly repulsed, or in their turn stand-

ing firm against the reiterated shock of fresh assailants, that we are enabled to collect the discriminating features of their character. To estimate the relative merits of a veteran and an irregular force, merely from observing their evolutions, when no enemy is at hand to disturb their regularity, is to allow the senses to usurp an unnatural dominion over the reason.

There is always a risk lest the standard of excellence be degraded to the level of practical imperfection. There is scarcely any institution which has not been perverted by the folly of mankind to purposes foreign to its nature and original design, and in proportion as they neglect the substance, they improve in an attachment to the empty forms. As the discriminating excellence of soldiers appears to be almost forgotten in a blind passion for empty parade, the following extract from the life of a celebrated general may be subjoined, as it contains a correct and spirited delineation of the military character.

“ Zieten had the satisfaction to bring Frederick the
 “ wreck of that army, which now scarcely formed
 “ a body of fifteen thousand men ; but they were all
 “ warriors, inured to danger and fatigue, and who
 “ had shewn themselves incapable of desertion ;
 “ choice troops, ripe for exploits, and waiting only
 “ the voice of their prince, their country, and the
 “ call of honour, to rekindle in their breasts the fa-
 “ cred fire of heroism.” This reinforcement, we are
 informed, though small with regard to number and
 appearance,

appearance, Frederick knew well how to appreciate for their courage, and shortly afterwards to turn to good account.

It appears to be the height of folly to indulge an expectation that a force so constituted as the Militia can ever attain to any thing like the perfection of veteran troops. At any rate it is anomalous in its character, and though it may be equally useful with a regular force, in swelling a numerical statement, yet it is evident that it never can form, in one view at least, any very considerable accession to the national strength. It can inspire our enemies with no dread of our power ; it cannot therefore increase our importance among the states of Europe ; except for the purposes of passive defence, it is almost totally useless. Nothing appears therefore to be more impolitic, or more calculated to crush the energies of a great nation, than to lock up such an essential portion of her resources in a force purely defensive. The contrivers of these impotent projects appear to be oppressed by the consciousness of their own weakness. Their system of policy hinges altogether on maxims of timid prudence. Their caution is pushed to excess ; it has nothing in it characteristic of rational nature. All their measures seem to be the offspring of mean views, and of feeble and irresolute counsels. Neither in their plans of internal policy, nor in their transactions with foreign powers, is it possible to discern that decisive boldness and energy, which fits men to guide the affairs of a great nation in a time of peril.

ril and trouble. That narrow caution which aims exclusively at negative good, and which, if acted upon in the transactions of private society, would lead to certain and gradual decay, is scarcely less fatal when it happens to predominate in the councils of a powerful state. It is impossible in the nature of things to carry on successfully a system of pure defence, because it is beyond the competency of human prudence to provide against all those unlooked for casualties to which the best laid schemes are liable. A nation, therefore, which is exposed to all the fatalities of war, and is not in a situation to avail itself of those prosperous chances which are occasionally cast up in the fluctuating tide of human affairs, is placed in the worst situation which can well be conceived. It is evident that the creation of a force, so clogged in the conditions of its service, and disabled from active and enterprising exertion against the enemy, tends to reduce Britain to this degraded state; and by limiting her views to a base and uncertain security, to break the spirit of a free people, hitherto accustomed to identify their existence with their glory. How either the ambition of Bonaparte is to be repressed, or his insolence chastised, while such a proportion of our military force is systematically disabled, it is not very easy to conceive; an impartial observer would rather be led to conclude from our present penury of effective resources, and from the inadequacy of our means to enforce our just claims, that our hopes still centered in the temporary expedient of an ignominious peace.

Regular Army.

IT is admitted on all hands, that the British army eminently excels in all those virtues, which form the peculiar ornament of the military character. The splendid exploits which it has atchieved, while they are the surest test of its great excellence, tend at the same time to perpetuate, in all its native fervour, that enthusiasm which is the great incentive to heroic enterprise. It was very justly observed by an eminent officer *, “ that the happy effects which the victories atchieved in Egypt, naturally produced on the minds of the army, was not confined to those brave men by whom they were gained. Every British soldier sympathized with them; every regiment in the service felt an increased confidence in its powers; and when marching against the enemy would be electrified by the sound of Alexandria.”

The standing army being therefore the most valuable portion of our military force, whether for the purposes of active exertion, or of internal security, the obvious policy of Britain, at the commencement of a new war undoubtedly consisted in increasing the number of her effective troops, in forming real soldiers decisive in their character, and fit to oppose an effectual bar to the progress of an invading army. Had the money which has been unnecessarily spent

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* Col. Crawford's speech, Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. I. p. 581.

on the volunteers, and on raising the militia and army of reserve, been employed in filling up the deficiencies of the Regular army, we would have possessed a valuable force, well trained and disciplined, and fit for any sort of service.

The establishment of a large military force has been thought by many eminent statesmen to be dangerous to liberty; and it certainly is so, where the army is linked by no tie to the political institutions of a state. But in Britain, where almost all the military officers of rank are closely connected with the natural aristocracy of the country, it seems impossible that the army can be converted into an engine of arbitrary power. The general complexion of the national manners, by presenting insuperable obstacles to the success of such a scheme, would also deter the most desperate minister from ever seriously thinking of its practicability. It is not merely from a naked view of the laws and political institutions of Britain, that the practical effects of her government can be truly discerned; those laws and institutions are indeed, abstractly considered, of infinite importance; but it is to the genius, habits, and manners of the people, that they owe their energy and perfection. Under the fostering influence of a free constitution, society has in Britain advanced to perfection with a degree of rapidity, of which history affords no example. The spirit of commercial enterprise has been daily acquiring new vigour; arts and sciences have flourished; and the blessings of knowledge have been generally diffused through all the various

rious classes of the community. An improved state of society, which is extremely unfavourable to an arbitrary government, is admirably adapted to the genius of a free constitution ; it is a soil exactly congenial to its nature. Men learn to recognize in the blessings which they enjoy, the practical benefit of those institutions which equally extend their beneficent protection to all classes and orders of society. The principles of liberty, when they lay hold of the mind, not only enlarge the understanding, but they warm the passions. Men become enthusiasts in the cause. In Britain an attachment to liberty is the predominating characteristic of the national manners. The army partakes of the general spirit, more particularly the officers, many of whom are members of the legislature, and both understand and feel the full value of their civil rights. It is evident that such an army could not be depended on as an effectual instrument of despotism. The bare apprehension of a disaffected army is sufficient to distract the most vigorous counsels, and to frustrate the best laid schemes. The measures of Charles I. were broke by the disinclination of his troops to the cause in which they were to fight, and on the eve of the revolution the army gave such strong indications of their aversion to the schemes of the court, that it was evident little dependence could be placed on their exertions. Unless soldiers can be detached from all sympathy of feeling with the great body of the people, it never can be imagined that they will be instrumental in fixing a yoke upon
their

their fellow subjects which they abhor. Allowing however, the possibility of finding in the whole kingdom as many men as would concur in such a project, by what means are they to be brought together and formed into a military force. The army must be new modelled as a preliminary step. How measures for that purpose are to be adopted so secretly as to escape the watchful jealousy of parliament, it is difficult to conceive. The jealousy of that body once awakened, it does not require much foresight to predict the speedy destruction of any desperate cabal that should conspire against the liberties of their country. The dangers to be provided against by the maintenance of a standing army are notorious and imminent, while the apprehensions to which it gives rise, can only be realised by a train of consequences so distant and so slightly connected, that they seem to be wholly without the range of rational speculation.

As the establishment of an effective military force appears, therefore, to be the only expedient for ensuring safety at home, and respect abroad, it is to be lamented, that the measures which were adopted in providing a defensive force, should have put such a complete stop to any farther progress in recruiting the regular troops. The disorder and mischief, which from this source spread through the whole system of national defence, though long very confidently denied, became at length so notorious that all farther concealment was utterly impracticable. Mr. Pitt, immediately on his coming into power, endeavoured

voured to apply a remedy to those evils. The plan which he brought forward for this purpose, merits particular attention, not only on account of its own individual importance, but because it involves a consideration of all the various measures which have been resorted to for the purpose of increasing the military force of Britain.

The object of Mr. Pitt's scheme was to put an end to the obstacles which arose from the competition of high bounties, to make good the existing deficiencies in the army of reserve, and in the militia, amounting in the former to 9000 men, and in the latter to 7000. The force raised to complete these deficiencies was to be annexed, in the form of separate battallions, to the regular army, and the deficiencies occasioned by enlistments for general service, to which the new levies were to be invited, were to be distributed among the several counties, in order to their being filled up. The militia were also to be reduced from 74,000 to 40,000 men. This additional force was not to be raised by the common mode of recruiting; the business was to be entrusted to parish officers, who were allowed to give a bounty of 15*l*. In case the men were not found, the counties were subjected to a penalty of 20*l*. for each man.

Of the abolition of the ballot, it is to be presumed, that very few will disapprove, who have either considered its ruinous effects on the regular recruiting, or the misery which has uniformly followed on

its execution ; its abandonment was not a matter of choice, but of absolute necessity, imperiously prescribed by the evidence of the plainest facts. The characteristic feature of Mr. Pitt's plan appears to consist principally in his entrusting the business of recruiting sergeants to parish officers. This new mode of raising men undoubtedly appears at first view to be somewhat whimsical, but if it is found on a more attentive examination, to be well adapted to attain its object, it ought not on that account to be rashly ridiculed, or condemned. It will be proper therefore to examine the reasons which were urged in support of this deviation from the ordinary mode of recruiting. On this point Mr. Pitt observed, that " the local acquaintance, the exertions, and influence, which parish-officers may be supposed to have, will be found a much better means of producing the force wanted than a general loose system of recruiting." In support of this assertion, and in opposition to the " ingenious speculations" of those who condemned this part of his scheme, Mr. Pitt placed the evidence of experience ; " he had only to state, that within little more than twelve months no less than 100,000 men had been procured through the medium of local exertion ; and where, he would ask, could a precedent be found for any thing like an equal number raised within an equal length of time by the ordinary recruiting. It was impossible." But where, it may be asked, can a precedent be found

found for such enormous bounties as were produced by local exertion? Had those who were employed in the ordinary recruiting, been allowed to double or triple the ordinary bounty, and at the same time to restrict the term of service, there is little doubt but the same number of men would have been very speedily procured. Mr. Pitt's reasoning is founded on a very obvious fallacy. He institutes a comparison between two cases of which he misrepresents the most material circumstances. Men who, with a limited bounty, recruit for a service unlimited as to time and place, are not likely to carry on a successful competition with those who offer more favourable terms of service, and a much higher bounty. The beneficial effects which Mr. Pitt ascribes to local exertion, may with far more propriety be referred to the operation of enormous bounties. As vague and general terms are however very apt to mislead the judgment, it will be necessary to ascertain more clearly the nature of those general principles, on which "local exertion, acquaintance, and connexion" depend for their effect. In the constitution of society the operation of two opposite principles is plainly discernible. On the one hand we are created social beings; we are rather disposed to cultivate the goodwill of our fellow-creatures than to court their enmity. Those dispositions being congenial to the native feelings of the human mind, we willingly follow their impulse, until they interfere with the selfish passions of our nature, when their influence is checked, and almost extinguished

guished by a more powerful principle of action operating in a contrary direction. It is absolutely necessary that the seeds of social benevolence be implanted in the human mind, otherwise society would want the means of its own conservation ; the social principle is the bond which holds together its component parts ; but it is chiefly to the operation of the selfish passions that we must ascribe the peculiar form into which it has been cast. The social principle is comparatively a very feeble and precarious motive of human action ; it is checked by the collision of contending interests, and is never visible in the important transactions of society. A statesman might as well impose a tax and trust to the honesty of mankind for its payment, as expect from its influence any permanent assistance to a political measure. But we calculate on the effects of the selfish principle with as much certainty as on the effects of a physical cause ; the most cautious politician may risk the success of his measures on its efficacy ; he has a hold which, he is sure, will not misgive him. The effect of local exertion, acquaintance, and connexion, must evidently be produced by those feelings of kindness and goodwill to which a long residence in the same place naturally gives rise. It must be acknowledged that men who have lived together for any length of time, form connexions more or less intimate according to the circumstances in which they are placed. These connexions are cemented and preserved by that interchange of good offices which arises from the reciprocal

cal necessities of mankind. Where the relations by which men are united are very close and intimate, and where the ties of affection are superadded to those of reciprocal necessity, local influence may possibly be a very powerful instrument in the hands of a skilful statesman. But surely nothing can be more wild and chimerical than to look to the operation of such a principle in a state of society, where men are held together by principles purely commercial, and where they own scarcely any other ties than those of interest and convenience. When an individual is ballotted, does he depend for assistance on those loose and transitory relations in which a local residence has placed him? Is he so foolish and inexperienced as to imagine that any of his acquaintances will materially contribute to rescue him from the dilemma in which he is involved? If he has money he immediately sets about procuring a substitute. When he has found a man who is willing to serve in the militia, or army of reserve, by what arguments does he endeavour to secure him? Does he ground his plea on acquaintance, long residence together in the same place, or on any of those motives which may be comprised under the general term of local exertion? On the contrary the whole transaction is conducted on the principles of a mercenary bargain, the one party offering the smallest sum, which he thinks, will be accepted, and the recruit making a demand proportionally exorbitant. With what propriety, therefore, can men procured in this way be
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said to be raised by local exertion? Is it not evidently by means of an extravagant bounty? And would not recruiting sergeants have addressed the same motives to them with much better effect?

It is plain both from principle and experience, that where men unconnected with the army are employed to recruit, bounties must rise progressively, until they have attained a maximum, at which point the whole business must finally stop. Almost the whole force raised for the army of reserve, has been procured by local exertion, that is to say, by men employed in other vocations, and converted, as chance directed, into recruiting sergeants. During the operation of that plan, bounties were gradually rising, and it is remarkable that though they ultimately attained to a height far beyond any former precedent, yet many counties found it impossible to complete the proportion of men assigned them; the ballot was at a stand although 50l. and even more was offered for substitutes. It is acknowledged on all hands that the difficulty of recruiting the army does not arise from a deficient population. How then are we to account for this strange and notorious fact, that though bounties rose to 50, and 60l. yet men could not be procured for limited service even on these disadvantageous terms? It must surely arise from some fatal error in the mode of recruiting. That error evidently consists in employing men to raise soldiers who are unconnected with the army.

To those who have considered with attention the
nature

nature of those employments, of which a constant exposure to peril forms the characteristic distinction, it will appear evident that they must be supported by principles in some degree peculiar to themselves. The chief motive to a diligent exercise of those peaceful occupations in which the majority of mankind are engaged, is the desire of gain. But it would be evidently impossible in this way to counterbalance the evils incident to a life of peril and fatigue. No man would endure the alarm and anxiety connected with such a life except for a much larger sum than it would be expedient or even possible to give him. Men who quit the safe and peaceful vocations of civil society for a mode of life infinitely more hazardous, must therefore be impelled by other and more powerful motives of action than the love of gain. These motives will be found to consist in the desire of honour and distinction, which is the peculiar reward and incentive of those who bravely face danger. Enthusiasm and the love of glory, combined however with other encouragements, are the natural and only effectual supports of the perilous professions. By the influence of those passions, they lay a surer and far more lasting hold of the mind than any mechanical employment of which a comfortable subsistence is the sole object. Young men frequently manifest an attachment to the profession of a sailor, which overpowers the counsel of friends, and breaks through all sober considerations of reason and prudence; even through life a sailor preserves a characteristic enthusiasm

thusiasm for his profession; the ardour of his attachment, far from being weakened, rather appears to acquire additional strength from the numerous perils and hardships by which he is assailed. It would be impossible to procure a sufficient number of sailors either for the purposes of commerce or of war, if they were to be wholly guided in their choice of a profession, by mercenary or prudential motives, because there does not exist any principle of comparison between money and the evils to which a sailor's life is exposed. Money cannot pay a man for leaving his dearest friends and connexions, and for exposing his life to the contagion of unhealthy climates, to the perils of storms, or to the uncertain chances of battle. Accordingly it will be found that men are frequently induced to go to sea from a love for the profession, and from an admiration of the character of a sailor; it is this which by giving a powerful impulse to the passions supercedes the necessity of any unusual pecuniary compensation *. The profession of a soldier being analogous, in its discriminating features to that of a sailor, must be supported by similar inducements. It would be impossible to pay men for exposing themselves to the dangers and fatigues

* Dr. Smith very justly remarks concerning the condition of common sailors, that " Though their skill and dexterity are much superior to that of almost any artificers, and though their whole life is one continual scene of hardship and danger, yet for all this dexterity and skill, for all those hardships and dangers, while they remain in the condition of common sailors, they receive scarce any other recompense but the pleasure of exercising the one, and surmounting the other.

tigues of a military life. And it is not necessary, because the army presents other and more powerful attractions to the mind. The splendour of military shew, the love of present ease and pleasure, the ambition of distinction and honour, the desire of adventure, all, or any, or part, of these motives being variously combined, according to the different tempers and inclinations of mankind, with the sanguine hopes *, or the unsteady propensities of youth, give an adequate impulse to the mind. Recruiting sergeants always appeal to those motives, and where government have studied to give due facility to their exertions, by bestowing on the soldier exclusive privileges, immunities, ornamental and honorary dis-

N tinctions,

“ other. Their wages are not greater than those of common labour-
 “ ers at the port which regulates the rate of seamen’s wages.”
 The same author likewise observes, that, “ The dangers and
 “ hair-breadth escapes of a life of adventures, instead of disheartening
 “ young people, seem frequently to recommend a trade to them. A
 “ tender mother, among the inferior ranks of people, is often afraid to
 “ send her son to school at a sea-port town, lest the conversation and
 “ adventures of the sailors should entice him to go to sea. The distant
 “ prospect of hazards, from which we can hope to extricate ourselves
 “ by courage and address, is not disagreeable to us, and does not
 “ raise the wages of labour in any employment.” *Wealth of Nations*,
Vol. I. p. 167, 168.

* What a common soldier may lose is obvious enough. Without regarding the danger, however, young volunteers never enlist so readily as at the beginning of a new war ; and though they have scarce any chance of preferment, they figure to themselves, in their youthful fancies, a thousand occasions of acquiring honour and distinction which never occur. These romantick hopes make the whole price of their blood. Their pay is less than that of common labourers, and in actual service their fatigues are much greater. *Ibid. p. 169.*

tinctions, and in recompence of faithful service, the certainty of future provision, they cannot fail, by creating an attachment to the military character and profession, to procure men without the aid of mercenary temptations. Where men connected with the army are employed in recruiting, they have no money to squander away in bounties ; their terms are unalterable ; the knowledge of these two circumstances precludes at once all that vile and sordid bargaining which is the sure consequence of any other mode of recruiting ; it changes the whole nature of the transaction. As they have no pecuniary bribes to offer, they must procure men by different inducements ; their conversation, their military dress and appearance, tends to create prepossessions in favour of the character of a soldier ; these impressions they endeavour to strengthen by a very full, and in their stile, an eloquent exposition of the advantages of the military profession, by demonstrating its infinite superiority to every sort of mechanical drudgery ; by flattering the pride and ambition of their hearers, and by awakening in their minds all those feelings which render men impatient under the restraints of sober industry. In this way the British army was formerly recruited ; the bounty allowed was only one guinea, which could be no adequate inducement to those who were otherwise averse to a military life. The institution of the Militia, and the consequent practice of admitting of service by substitute, has placed the recruiting service on

a quite different footing. The operation of the ballot immediately produces what is called local exertion. The efforts of a great number of individuals, quickened by the apprehension of severe penalties, are immediately employed throughout the whole country to procure substitutes. It is evident, that when men are employed to recruit, who are totally unconnected with the army, and complete strangers to the habits and feelings of soldiers, they cannot inspire enthusiasm by their own example, nor can they create an attachment to the military profession by commenting and expatiating on its various advantages ; all their encouragements must be drawn from a corrupt source ; instead of awakening in the mind all those enthusiastic feelings, which are the only permanent and effectual support of the perilous professions, they must depend wholly on the influence of sordid passions. The whole transaction will assume the complexion of a mercenary contract, the recruit regulating his demands exactly according to the necessities of his principal. Men are thus allured into a sort of spurious military service, not by any attachment to the character and profession of a soldier, but by sordid calculations of gain. It is impossible that any mode of raising men can be devised more destructive to the recruiting service, and better calculated to extinguish all those generous feelings which are the only genuine support of the military profession. There cannot be a more manifest absurdity than to attempt to allure men into the army by

motives of interest. It is impracticable in the nature of things to provide an effectual encouragement in money to those who are not disposed in favour of a military life. But it is very evident, that individuals selected indiscriminately from all the various classes of society, totally unacquainted with the habits and feelings of soldiers, must confine themselves exclusively to pecuniary inducements. The consequence therefore of employing men of this description in the recruiting service is plain. Bounties must continue rising until it is impossible to provide money to pay them, when the whole business will remain stationary. The truth of these reasonings is put beyond the possibility of contradiction by the evidence of facts. The army was formerly supplied with recruits by the means of recruiting sergeants at a bounty of one guinea; by the influence of local exertion, bounties have been raised to from 35 l. to 70 l., and several counties have found it impossible, even at that exorbitant rate, to procure a sufficient number of men to complete their respective quotas of the Militia and army of Reserve. Both fact and principle therefore point with irresistible clearness to the same conclusion. The scheme of recruiting the army by means of local exertion, so far from being attended with the beneficial effects ascribed to it, appears to hold a distinguished place among those pernicious innovations and corruptions by which the spirit of the military profession has of late years been so much perverted and debased.

The new mode of raising men is however the characteristic feature of Mr. Pitt's project. In defence of this principle, Mr. Pitt states, that a greater number of men have been raised by means of local exertion, than could possibly have been found in any other way. But it is evident that Mr. Pitt, in overlooking the influence of high bounties, and in ascribing the effects of the ballot to local exertion, mistakes an accidental circumstance for an efficient cause. Local exertion would have been found a very ineffectual mode of supplying the army, had it not been backed by the operation of high bounties. When individuals, who are not soldiers, are employed to recruit, money is the only inducement which they have to offer, and although high bounties are very justly complained of, yet that complaint comes with a very bad grace from those who gave their sanction to the plan of the Army of Reserve; a measure which directly and necessarily tended to produce the evil complained of, by substituting in the room of an attachment to the profession and character of a soldier, by which the army was formerly supported, the base and sordid motives of pecuniary gain. The mischief, however, from whatever cause it may have arisen, has become too manifest for concealment or palliation, and the remedy which it is the object of Mr. Pitt's bill to apply, consists in employing parish officers to recruit, and in prohibiting them from giving a higher bounty than 15*l*. To restrict bounties within reasonable limits

limits in an act of parliament is certainly no difficult matter ; this is an expedient, which if effectual to the end proposed, would, on account of its simplicity, lay a just claim to admiration. But it is evident, that the legislature might with equal propriety attempt to set limits to the price of corn, or of any other commodity. If the enlisting of men is to be conducted on commercial principles, the market price must be given for recruits, otherwise they will not be procured. It appears, and it is indeed noticed by Mr. Pitt, that several counties had become liable to heavy fines from not having completed the entire complement of men required of them. Their case is by no means singular. The difficulty and even the impossibility of raising more men through the medium of local exertion is strongly felt over the whole country, even although, in Scotland 35*l.* and even 40*l.* and in England, 50*l.*, 60*l.*, and 70*l.* have been offered for substitutes. Under these circumstances, it is surely a most unaccountable mode of procedure, to endeavour to procure men by offering less favourable terms. Is it to be imagined that those who have refused 40*l.*, 50*l.*, and 60*l.*, will be induced to enter into the army for 15*l.* And yet the success of the project wholly hinges on this radical absurdity. It was confessed on all hands, that no more men could be procured by means of the ballot, and it was thought advisable, on that account, to suspend its operation ; bounties had arisen to an unprecedented excess, and yet men could

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not be found ; the recruiting service was at a stand, the militia and army of reserve were both deficient in their requisite complement ; as a remedy for all this variety of mischief, the recruiting service is to be entrusted to parish officers in England, and to the heritors of parishes in Scotland, who are prohibited from giving more than the comparatively small bounty of 15 l., and it really seems to be imagined that they will prevail upon men to do for 15 l., what they have refused to do for four times the sum. If it is allowable to build any conclusion on those maxims of common sense, which still govern the conduct of men in private society, into whatever discredit they may have fallen in the house of commons, one would naturally be apt to think that when two parties differed concerning the terms of a bargain, it would be very idle and preposterous to make any proposition which would tend to make their mutual claims more irreconcilable. And yet this is precisely what is proposed by the bill in question. A bounty of 15 l., is offered to those who have in effect resisted the temptation of a much higher bribe. And to add iniquity to folly, men are to be punished with fines because they cannot procure recruits on conditions, with which it is impossible to comply. The contrivers of this measure seem to have acted in open contradiction to the plainest facts. It appears that several counties had failed to procure the complement of men required of them, even although they had offered what was universally judged to be

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extravagant bounty. Can any thing be conceived more absurd and tyrannical, than to cripple their efforts by prohibiting them from offering more than a third part of the customary bounty, and to threaten them with additional penalties, in case they do not succeed. It is exactly as if a master were to send his servant to buy a bushel of wheat, when the market price was at 7s., and to threaten to punish him if he did not procure it for 2s. 6d *. Men will not enlist for the sum to which these parish officers are restricted, and consequently the parishes must be fined. To punish men for not doing what is impossible, has been always reckoned one of the peculiar privileges of arbitrary power, and to submit patiently to such treatment, the extreme limit of passive obedience. It is observed by one of the court preachers in the time of Charles I. that, “ if princes command
 “ any thing which subjects may not perform, be-
 “ cause it is against the laws of God, or of nature,
 “ or impossible ; Yet subjects are bound to undergo
 “ the punishment, without either resisting, or rail-
 “ ing, or reviling ; and so to yield a passive obe-
 “ dience, where they cannot exhibit an active one.” The penal part of Mr. Pitt’s bill appears to be contrived in perfect conformity to these enlightened maxims of government. Such a project could not possibly succeed ; its miscarriage was a matter not of vague prediction, but of absolute certainty.

* See Mr. Fox’s Speech, Cobbet’s Parliamentary Debates, Vol. II.

ty. If the recruiting of the army is to be conducted by men who are not soldiers, a high bounty must be given, otherwise recruits will not be procured; money is the only temptation which such men have to offer. Recruiting sergeants never were accustomed to procure men by the aid of mercenary motives: to limit them therefore to a fixed sum in the way of bounty is rational and consistent; but to employ parish officers to procure men, and to deprive them of the only lawful and effectual inducement which they have to offer them, namely money, and at the same time to inflict penalties on the counties in case their efforts, thus crippled and disabled, are not successful, is a complication of folly and oppression, of which the best palliation is, that it is impracticable.

Although these arguments, derived from the nature and principle of the measure, appear to be sufficiently convincing, they are farther confirmed by the evidence of its complete miscarriage throughout the whole country. Judging of it as a plan for raising men, its inefficacy appears from experience to be manifest. It was chiefly on the ground of its notorious failure, that Mr. Sheridan thought proper to move for its repeal in the subsequent session of parliament. In order to set the question in a clearer light, I shall endeavour to exhibit a view of the principal arguments urged by both parties in support of their opinions.

The object of Mr. Sheridan was to prove that the measure had wholly failed, and that it ought to

be abandoned. For this purpose, he stated, that out of 52 counties of England and Wales, 1295 men were raised; that out of this number 266 deserted, leaving only 1079 effective soldiers, of which 343 entered for general service. In Scotland, 267 men were procured, of which 43 entered for general service. In Ireland, 1081 were procured, of which none entered into the line. The object of the measure, as stated by Mr. Pitt, was to create a new additional force, which might afford a permanent supply to the regular army. The deficiencies of the army of reserve, and in the militia, amounting to 16,000 men were to be made good, and the men thus raised were to be annexed in the form of separate battalions to regular regiments. From the intercourse which must necessarily subsist between the new levies and the veteran troops the most beneficial effects were expected to arise. Mutual affection and attachment, it was imagined, would be created in the whole body, and a powerful motive would be thus held out to the new levies to enlist for general service. The measure had at once in view our immediate defence and our future strength. "Its object (according to Mr. Pitt) was "to provide for both an offensive and defensive force, "and by the most expeditious and effectual means," thus combining every possible advantage. The bill was passed in the end of June, and in the course of six or seven months, it appears that 2427 men were raised, of which 386 entered for general service; a most important accession surely to the military force of

of a country containing fifteen millions of inhabitants.

It further appears that in Lancashire 255 men are deficient by desertion or otherwise, which shews pretty clearly that the evils apprehended from the interference of parish officers have not been altogether imaginary, and that they have not been so solicitous to give the king a good foldier, as to get rid of a vagrant." These facts never having been contradicted, confirm by the incontrovertible evidence of experience, all those objections which were originally urged against the principle of the measure.

Mr. Pitt, who was resolved to adhere to his project, endeavoured to do away the effect of these strong facts. "The hon. gent. (he observes) in speaking of the effect of the bill, seems entirely to have lost sight of one circumstance very important to be considered, which is the period when the bill came into full activity. From whatever causes this arose, I shall not now stop to determine, but certain it is, that it was not till the 14th of November, that orders were first given for general recruiting to supply parishes where deficiencies existed. It is, therefore, to the operation of the bill, since that period, much more than to the effect it has produced in the preceding months, that we ought fairly to apply for an opinion of its merits. Looking then at the last three months, I find that on an average of each week, there have been nearly 200 recruits obtained. Thus taking three months as the average, the result will be,

“ that under the operation of the bill, it will produce an annual addition of betwixt nine or ten thousand men.”

Before examining the preceding argument, it may be asked, why was the execution of this measure delayed so much longer than that of the other measures adopted for the defence of the country. This delay, although it may not suit Mr. Pitt's purpose to enquire into the cause of it, forms a very important part of the case submitted to the consideration of parliament. The bill was passed in the end of June 1804, and the whole ^{or} country were instantly to be roused into a general state of activity to raise 16,000 men to supply the deficiencies of the Army of Reserve and the Militia. The execution of the measure was however found to be impracticable, and after several interruptions, its operation was finally suspended by the authority of the executive government until the 15th of November. The delay in carrying the project into execution, arising therefore, not from exterior causes, but from its own manifold defects, forms a very strong and rational ground of objection to its continuance. But allowing Mr. Pitt the full benefit of his argument, what does it amount to? Because within a given period, a certain number of men have been procured, does he mean seriously to maintain that he is warranted to hope for a proportional supply in future. The fallacy of this reasoning may be very easily pointed out. By the operation of the ballot, it is

is said, that 100,000 men were raised in the space of 18 months. But it does not certainly follow that the ballot would continue to produce a proportional supply. It is quite ridiculous indeed, to apply the rigid accuracy of arithmetical proportion to the fluctuating concerns of society. The science of politics depends not so much on numerical, as on moral calculations.

Mr. Pitt next proceeded to point out the obstacles which impeded the complete success of the measure, namely, the drain of men occasioned by the ballot for the militia and the army of reserve, by which about 100,000 recruits were raised in the short space of 18 months. He concluded, that if under the unfavourable operation of those obstacles, the bills had produced the effects already described, its success would answer all the expectations of its author, when those circumstances were removed. One great object, (he observed) was the removal of the excessive bounties created by the army of reserve; while the recollection of those high bounties existed, it was not to be imagined, that men recruiting with moderate bounties, could have a fair chance of success. When, however, the memory of them is in a certain degree obliterated, the bill would undoubtedly answer all the purposes for which it was framed.

This will scarcely be received as a satisfactory apology for the failure of the measure, when it is recollected that all those obstacles were plainly pointed out to Mr. Pitt. Was he not aware, when he opened

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ed his plan, of the deranged state of the recruiting service? Was it not the very express and avowed purpose of the measure to remedy the evils which arose from the competition of enormous bounties, and to raise men in spite of all the obstructions which then prevailed? If the plan failed in this essential point, it is vain to urge as an apology, the obstacles which it had to encounter. This accounts no doubt very satisfactorily for its miscarriage, but it does by no means excuse it. It only proves that it is ill adapted to the circumstances of the country, and that it ought, for the present, at least, to be abandoned. It was well known, and the fact was indeed stated by Mr. Pitt, when he first proposed his plan, that several counties had incurred very heavy penalties, because they could not raise their respective quotas of men for the militia and army of reserve; even though a bounty of 50 or 60 guineas was offered. Reasoning from this fact, it was very natural to conclude, that no benefit could arise from a measure, which entrusted the recruiting service to men unconnected with the army, and which, at the same time, crippled their efforts, by limiting them to the comparatively small bounty of 15 l. When men could not be procured by the exertions of individuals, even for a bounty of 50 guineas, upon what known principle was it imagined, that that mode of recruiting would be more successfully carried on with a diminished bounty?

Mr. Pitt very justly observed, that while the re-
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collection of high bounties existed it was not to be imagined that moderate bounties could have a fair chance of success ; he afterwards states that the bill had been applied chiefly to those districts where even under all the hazard of the penalties of the army of reserve and militia, men could not be procured, and he puts it to the candour of his hearers, whether if the bill had been less successful than it had been, it would have been at all matter of astonishment. Certainly not. But in that case, men might have been permitted to marvel at the obstinacy and folly which could have continued in such an important crisis, a project so very useless. The object of Mr. Pitt's plan was to raise 16,000 men ; the obstacles to its success were plainly seen and pointed out to him ; if the measure therefore was not calculated to triumph over those obstacles, why was it adopted ? Mr. Pitt's arguments prove very forcibly the original impolicy of the measure ; solely intent on accounting for the small number of men which it had produced, or in other words, for its failure, he shews that the means by which he proposed to raise 16,000 men, were in the existing circumstances of the country, totally inadequate to the end proposed. Men unconnected with the army will certainly never procure recruits with moderate bounties, because it is only by laying hold of the sordid passions that they can ever hope to effect their purpose. This furnishes an additional argument for recurring to the old mode of recruiting, namely, by sergeants, corporals, or
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men connected with the army, who were never accustomed to depend for success on mercenary motives, and whose exertions might naturally be expected on that account, to be attended with far more beneficial effects, than those of parish officers. The industry with which the statements of the total failure of the measure have been circulated over the country, the circumstance of its having last session encountered a violent opposition, and the expectation that it would certainly be repealed in the ensuing session of parliament are also stated as obstructions to its success, and it is supposed that when the country see that parliament is determined to give the measure a fair trial, and to impose the penalties attached to it, that even the knowledge of these circumstances will go a great way to produce the desired effect. “ At present (Mr. Pitt observes) I have no doubt that in several districts sufficient exertion has not been employed to procure the required quota, from an expectation that the penalties would not be enforced. When, however, they are fully apprized of the contrary, they will feel it necessary to make new efforts, and if these efforts are properly directed, there can be no question about procuring the necessary quotas.” It is surely very extraordinary that these statements concerning the failure of the measure, which are supposed to have so materially obstructed its operation, should have been spread over the whole country with such unaccountable

table success. Did those who were hostile to the measure monopolize all the ordinary channels of public intelligence? Was there no possibility of contradicting these statements, or did the ministry with a mistaken magnanimity, neglect all the ordinary expedients for procuring popularity to their measures? Had the general unanimity concerning the merits of this project been the result of wrong statements, how easily could it have been corrected?

But originating as it does in a strong view of its total inutility, it will daily gain new strength. No dread of penalties will ever call forth the zeal of the nation in support of such a hopeless project. The common sense of all mankind revolts at the idea of procuring men for a bounty of 15*l*, when they have already, in effect, rejected a much larger sum. Mr. Pitt endeavours to entangle the main point, on which the merits of the measure must be judged, namely, the propriety of entrusting the recruiting service to parish officers, with other questions with which it has no relation, and he occasionally substitutes in place of argument, contemptuous arrogance and confident assertion. "I confess (he observes) it has
 " never been my fortune within the walls of this
 " house, to hear any proposition so arrogantly and
 " so vehemently brought forward, which had so lit-
 " tle even of the appearance of argument to uphold
 " it. The principal object of the bill was, in the
 " first instance, to do away an evil which had become
 " a subject of general complaint. Has it not pro-

“duced this effect? Has it not relieved the counties
 “from excessive burdens? Has it not lowered the
 “excessive bounties which had brought regular
 “recruiting almost to a stand? And has it not
 “in this way become a most important auxiliary
 “to the augmentation of our disposable force?
 “Will it be attempted to be denied that the recruit-
 “ing is now going on with fresh spirit, since the
 “evil of excessive bounties has been removed?” That
 the plan of the Army of Reserve would necessarily
 lead to excessive bounties, and would in this way
 ruin the regular recruiting, was foreseen and plainly
 pointed out by Mr. Windham. It is surely, there-
 fore, somewhat singular, that those who were most
 zealous in promoting that measure, should come for-
 ward, after all its bad effects have been so fatally
 realized, and claim merit for having observed what
 was notorious to the whole world, and for having
 applied such a feeble remedy to such a deep rooted
 evil. Can it possibly be supposed, that the mere re-
 striction of bounties in an act of parliament will coun-
 teract that complication of mischief, which has been
 the necessary result of long and obstinate perseve-
 rance in a wrong system. If the increase of the regular
 army is essential to the glory, and even to the secu-
 rity of Britain, ought it not to be promoted by po-
 sitive encouragements? By exclusive honours, privi-
 leges, immunities, and rewards. Or, does vigour
 and energy operate by expedients merely negative?

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It is said that the recruiting of the army is going on with fresh spirit. Can there be a stronger reason for adhering to that old and approved mode of maintaining the army, and for abandoning the foolish project of parish officers? It is needless to enter into a verbal disputation about the meaning of the words *failure* or *miscarriage*; it is perfectly evident that the Parish bill has not, nor ever will materially add to the resources of Britain. It really seems to be of no use but to give a sort of vicious uniformity to that curious system, which appears to delight in the strangest and most unnatural combinations, which has already produced soldiers not subject to martial law, an army debarred from the chance of ever meeting a foe, and still continuing its inroads on the settled order and constitution of society, has converted parish officers into recruiting sergeants.

Without a radical change in the military arrangements of Britain, it seems impossible that she can ever be either formidable abroad, or even secure at home. Those who have been entrusted with the important duty of consolidating her resources into an efficient system of defence, have by a succession of weak and contradictory measures, crushed her energies, and enfeebled her power. Voluntarily deviating from that line of great and commanding policy which she has been hitherto accustomed almost invariably to pursue, they have marked out for her a path, more nearly approaching to the level of their

own narrow conceptions. They seem to have considered the attainment of a precarious security, as the utmost boundary of their humble ambition, and the force which they have provided accords perfectly in its nature and constitution with their grovelling views. Absorbed in the contemplation of a hostile invasion, their whole system has been pointed almost exclusively to this solitary possibility, and in pursuit of a base and inglorious safety, they have sacrificed the resources of their country.

It is impossible to frame any apology for those who with the full command of the spirit and resources of a free and powerful nation, leave her, after a length of time, almost naked and destitute of an effective force; who vauntingly hold out threats of chastisement to her enemies, and in every attempt to realize their boasted schemes, disclose more clearly the state of impotence to which they have reduced her.

F I N I S.

